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THE STRUGGLE FOR ALASKA'S
SUBMERGED LAND
DUNCAN HOLLOMON*
This article discusses the issues of navigability and chargeability as
they apply to the controversy surrounding disposition of submerged
lands in Alaska. The author concludes that the State of Alaska has
sufficient authority to regulate the uses of submerged lands through the
public trust doctrine and state definitions of navigability, rather than by
asserting that authority through outmoded theories of ownership inap-
propriate to the situation in Alaska. The author also argues that the
new Interior Department policy not to charge a federal-land grantee for
submerged land beneath non-navigable meanderable water bodies dero-
gates from the interest of the public and the federal government in
Alaska lands. Rather, federal statutory and case law should apply to
protect more adequately those interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is perhaps unusual for an old and arcane legal concept to be-
come the subject of a modem and far-reaching dispute. It is perhaps
even more unusual for such a dispute to have ramifications that have
extended far beyond the confines of the legal system to touch funda-
mental assumptions concerning allocation of power and responsibility
in our federal system. Nevertheless, as with the case of the tiny snail
darter, the presence of which halted a mammoth project,1 large and
unanticipated waves of consequence may emanate from the smallest or
least expected pebble of disturbance. Such has been the nature of the
dispute over submerged lands in Alaska.
With statehood in 1959, the new State of Alaska became entitled
to select for its use and control millions of acres of public land from
the federal government. Since then, court battles have raged between
the state and federal governments over the selection, ownership, and
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control of Alaska land. In 1970, the Alaska Natives joined the fray
after passage of the Alaska Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA"),2
which created a system of Native Corporations with claims to owner-
ship of extensive areas of Alaska territory. In 1980, enactment of the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA") 3 set-
tled the disposition of millions of acres of Alaska wilderness with their
preservation as national parks, monuments, and wildlife refuges. Nev-
ertheless, ANILCA left unresolved several of the issues dividing the
state, the Natives, and the federal government, and many questions
still remain regarding the ownership and control of Alaska's natural
resources.
In addition to its magnificent mountain ranges and vast areas of
arctic tundra, Alaska is blessed with innumerable streams, lakes, and
rivers. It is the ownership of the lands beneath these bodies of water
that has been the subject of vigorous contention, both at the policy
level in the state and federal governments, and in the courts. Property
rights in these so-called "submerged" lands are different from dry or
"fastlands" for reasons that trace back to .basic principles of early Ro-
man and English common law. To understand the background of the
current disputes and the problems involved in the disposition of these
submerged lands, one must investigate not only the federal statutes
that provide for the ownership of Alaska land, but also the significance
of the concept of navigability as it pertains to questions of title and
legislative jurisdiction.
In particular, the disposition of submerged land in Alaska de-
pends, in part, upon whether the water above was "navigable" at the
time of statehood. If the water was navigable, as a general rule, title to
the subaqueous land vested automatically in the state upon admission
to the Union.4 Consequently, submerged land beneath navigable wa-
ters is not available for selection by other claimants since it is already
owned by the state. The definition of navigability, then, is pivotal in
determining the ownership of Alaska's submerged lands.
On the other hand, the treatment of those submerged lands be-
neath non-navigable water depends upon the disposition made of them
by the federal government. The Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") is the federal agency that administers the allocation of
Alaska territory. Prior to 1983, the BLM treated land beneath non-
2. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
3. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94
Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C. &
48 U.S.C.); see infra note 316 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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navigable water as it did dry land. That is, the area under non-naviga-
ble water was included in the land grant, and the acreage was de-
ducted from the selector's allotted entitlement. Under a recent change
in policy by the Department of the Interior, however, the land beneath
large but non-navigable bodies of water now passes to the grantee by
operation of law, without the acreage being charged against the selec-
tor's entitlement. 5
While the state, the Natives, and the Department of the Interior
argue that this new policy merely corrects a past inequity by treating
Alaska like the other states, many of those interested in protecting
Alaska's submerged lands from further exploitation insist that the pol-
icy violates the compromises orginally settled in Congress when the
land allocation processes were established, and essentially gives away
valuable areas of Alaska lands. Two environmental groups have al-
ready challenged the new policy in the courts.6 Congress is now con-
sidering legislation to resolve the dispute by statutory ratification of
the new BLM policy.7
This article analyzes the twin issues of navigability and
chargeability as they pertain to the disposition of submerged lands in
Alaska. Each issue is considered in the broader context of the various
ways courts historically have treated submerged land. The various
legal theories underlying that treatment are explored, with a focus on
the legal concept of navigability as distinguishing "public" from "pri-
vate" waters. Finally, two suggested perspectives are offered: first, the
current emphasis on ownership of these subaqueous areas of valuable
natural resources obscures the more significant issue of the state's reg-
ulatory jurisdiction over and public usufructuary rights in these lands
and waters; second, permitting state riparian rights law to determine
the amount of land to pass from federal ownership, and how the acre-
age will be charged, may misconstrue applicable law to the derogation
of the federal interest in public land in Alaska.
5. See 48 Fed. Reg. 54,483 (1983) (announcing adoption of the new Interior
Department policy); infra notes 252-61 and accompanying text.
6. Wilderness Soc'y v. Carruthers, Civ. No. 84-1823 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 30, 1986).
7. On August 3, 1987, the House passed a bill that, if enacted, would ratify the
new chargeability policy. H.R. 2629, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 6940-44
(1987). Both this bill and the Senate version contain several other provisions relating
to the disposition of lands within the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge ("ANWR")
which may prove objectionable to key leaders in the Senate, particularly Senator Ted
Stevens of Alaska. S. 1493, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Hence, as of this writing,
passage of the Senate bill in this session is uncertain.
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II. THE LAND-SELECTION ENTITLEMENT STATUTES
Two statutes provide for the ownership of much of the territory
of Alaska: The Alaska Statehood Act,8 and the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act.9 These statutes did not, however, settle questions of
title, but rather provided the state and the Natives the right to select
certain quantities of public land which the federal government would
convey to them.10
A. The Statehood Act
Under the Alaska Statehood Act, Congress granted the new State
of Alaska the right to select for ownership approximately 104 million
acres of Alaska territory.'" Historically, states admitted into the
Union received by grant a certain quantity of land from the federal
government.12 Alaska is unique, however, in that the state was
granted no particular geographically defined land area, but rather the
right generally to select land so long as it was unclaimed, vacant, and
federally owned. The total entitlement is 28% of the entire area of the
state, an amount roughly the size of the entire State of California.' 3
B. ANCSA
Early in the state selection and conveyance process, many Alaska
Natives claimed that some of their lands were being wrongly taken
from them by the state. They asserted their ownership of substantial
portions of Alaska territory on the theory that they had occupied these
8. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a), 72 Stat. 339 (codi-
fied as amended at 48 U.S.C. note preceding § 21 (1982)).
9. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10. The state may select from any lands that are "vacant, unappropriated and
unreserved." Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a), 72 Stat. 339
(codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. note preceding § 21 (1982)). The Natives may
select from lands withdrawn for that purpose by the Secretary of the Interior.
ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a), 1611 (1982).
11. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a), 72 Stat. 339. As of
April 6, 1987, approximately 83 million acres had been conveyed. DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR, ALASKA STATE OFFICE, INFORMATION BULLETIN No. AK 87-127
(Apr. 1987).
12. Typically, the federal government granted the new state sections 16 and 36 of
each township. See Chapter XII (Grants to States on Admission into the Union) in P.
GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (Public Land Law Review
Commission, 1968).
13. Only two states received a greater percentage of their total area - Florida
(62%) and Louisiana (38%) - much of which was in the form of swamp-land grants.
Id. at 316 ("It should be remembered that at the time the swamplands were given
these and other states, it was thought that they would be more of a liability than an
asset."). By comparison, Arizona received 14% of its total area, New Mexico 16%,
and Utah 14%. Id.
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areas since time immemorial. Eventually the courts held that the land
occupied by the Natives was indeed unavailable for selection by the
state. 14 Since the boundaries of the lands claimed by the Natives
under aboriginal ownership were not defined precisely, the state selec-
tion process was delayed, pending a resolution of the question of Na-
tive aboriginal land claims.
The United States Congress resolved the issue with the passage of
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA") in 1971.15 In
exchange for extinguishment of all aboriginal Native land claims,
ANCSA provided a one-time payment of $962 million to Alaska Na-
tives and the right to select 44 million acres of federal land.' 6 As pro-
vided by ANCSA, a system of Native-owned corporations was
established to administer the land and financial capital. There are
thirteen regional corporations, twelve within specific geographical ar-
eas and one at large. 17 In addition, there are more than 200 village
corporations, composed of traditional village populations of twenty-
five or more inhabitants.' 8 Under ANCSA, each regional and village
corporation is entitled to select a certain quantity of federal land ac-
cording to a complex formula based on population and geographical
size. 19
III. THE SECTION/CONVEYANCE PROCESS
A. Navigability and the Equal Footing Doctrine
The state and the Native corporations make their selections from
federal lands withdrawn for that purpose by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. The federal government then conveys the selected lands to the
grantee.20 Where the land is dry, this process of selection and convey-
ance is fairly straightforward. It becomes more complicated when the
14. Alaska v. Udall, 420 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub noma.
Alaska v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 1076 (1970) (Indian use of land selected by the state pursu-
ant to the Statehood Act could constitute a condition that would remove the status of
such lands as "vacant, unappropriated and unreserved"); Aguilar v. United States,
474 F. Supp. 840, 843 (D. Alaska 1979) (use and occupancy prior to state selection
gave Native claimants a preference right over the state).
15. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see also Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp.
1359, 1371 (D.D.C. 1973) (until action by Congress to extinguish rights of Alaska
Natives in lands claimed on the basis of use and occupancy, such claims remain an
encumbrance on the land and fee remains in the United States).
16. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605, 1611 (1982).
17. Id. § 1606(a), (e).
18. Id. § 1610(b).
19. Id. §§ 1611, 1613.
20. Technically, the issuance of a patent conveying title from the United States to
a grantee follows a survey of the territory selected. Most of Alaska's territory has yet
to be surveyed, and, in lieu of a patent, the federal government issues to the Natives a
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selected lands contain rivers, lakes, and streams. First, whether an
area of inland submerged land is available for selection at all depends
upon whether the surface waters are navigable.2 1 If the waters are
navigable, historically, title to the bed vested in the state automatically
upon statehood under the "Equal Footing Doctrine. '22 Derived from
Article IV, section 3 of the United States Constitution, which provides
for the admission of new states into the Union, the Equal Footing
Doctrine requires that new states be admitted on an "equal footing"
with other states; that is, with the same degree of sovereignty pos-
sessed by the original thirteen states.23 Since the original states held
title to the submerged lands under all navigable waters within their
borders, 24 the Equal Footing Doctrine has been held to require that,
upon admission, each new state automatically acquires title to the sub-
merged lands beneath its inland and tidal navigable waters.25 In other
words, title to lands beneath navigable waters within the state's bound-
aries is held by the state, not through a grant from the federal govern-
ment, or by an act of Congress, but rather as result of what has been
held to be the constitutional requirement of equal footing.26
Not all submerged lands beneath navigable waters automatically
became the property of the state, however. Regardless of the naviga-
bility of the water above, submerged lands that were withdrawn from
entry at the time of statehood may remain in federal ownership.2 7
so-called "interim conveyance" following selection, which conveys full title, subject to
a later survey to delineate the boundaries more precisely in the patent. See 43 C.F.R.
§ 2650.0-5(h) (1986) (ratified by ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. § 16210)(1) (1982)). Similarly,
conveyance of unsurveyed lands to the state are deemed "tentatively approved," pend-
ing final survey and patent. See 43 U.S.C. § 1635.
21. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
22. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-29 (1845).
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413-16 (1842).
25. Pollard's Lessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 50, 58 (1894). The Submerged Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1982)), ratified the Equal Footing Doctrine by
quitclaiming all lands beneath navigable water to the respective states to a line three
miles distant from the coast. This statute was passed in response to the "Tidelands
cases," in which the Supreme Court held that the United States, not the individual
states, held title to the submerged coastlands up to the high-water mark. United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699
(1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). The Act is made applicable to
Alaska by the Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(m), 72 Stat. 339
(codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. note preceding § 21 (1982)).
26. See Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363 (1977).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 766 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 967 (1970) (property withheld, conveyed, or withdrawn by the federal gov-
ernment prior to statehood did not pass to the state); see also Utah Div. of State Lands
v. United States, - U.S. _, 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987).
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Similarly, if the submerged lands were the subject of a prior grant by
the federal government, such as to a Native tribe, then that grant su-
persedes any claim by the state under the Doctrine of Equal Footing.28
Otherwise, as required by the Equal Footing Doctrine, all submerged
lands beneath navigable waters pass to the state upon statehood.
As a result of the Equal Footing Doctrine, land beneath navigable
water (1) cannot be selected by a Native corporation and (2) need not
be selected by the state (since title was transferred upon statehood).
Thus, in most cases the Equal Footing Doctrine requires exclusion
from a federal land grant of all submerged land beneath navigable bod-
ies of water located within the parcels conveyed.29 Moreover, this sub-
merged acreage is not charged against the state's total federal land
entitlement, since the state already possesses title.30 The definition of
navigability thus assumes critical importance in the determination of
the ownership of the natural resources that are located beneath
Alaska's waters.
B. Land Beneath Navigable Waters: The Federal Test
for Navigability
The language of the general federal test for navigability is not
particularly complicated. First formulated in 1870 in The Daniel
Ball, 3 1 a case involving federal admiralty jurisdiction, the test is essen-
tially a common-sense evaluation of whether the water body can sup-
port commercial trade and travel by boat.32 However, just how this
traditional navigability test is to be applied in the unique Alaskan geo-
graphical context is the source of much contention. Bodies of water
appear in many different forms in Alaska. Streams and rivers emanate
from the forward edges of huge glaciers; thousands of small lakes
pockmark the wilderness, most of which are accessible only by float-
planes that "puddle-jump" from one back country area to another.
Most of these water bodies are frozen for the greater part of the year
and are used for trade and travel in ways that differ from those tradi-
tional in the lower forty-eight. For example, dogsled and snowmobile
trails often follow frozen river beds. To complicate matters further,
28. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
29. 43 C.F.R. § 2650.5-1 (1986); see also Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corval-
lis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 376 (1977) ("[T]he Federal Government has no
power to convey lands which are rightfully the State's under the equal-footing
doctrine.").
30. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 174 F. Supp. 500, 502-03 (D. Alaska
1959).
31. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
32. Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922); see also
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
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many of the aqueous areas in Alaska are marshy or criss-crossed with
braided streams.
Because the conditions typically found in Alaska are unlike those
in the lower forty-eight states, where the definition of navigability
evolved, the applicability of the traditional definition of navigability to
the circumstances found in Alaska is problematic. The stakes in-
volved in the resolution of these problems are very high indeed. The
fate of potentially millions of acres of submerged land, rich in natural
resources, hangs in the balance.
C. Lands Beneath Non-Navigable Waters: The New
"Chargeability" Policy
The second major issue of contention in the selection and convey-
ance process is the question of how submerged lands beneath non-nav-
igable waters are to be counted against selection entitlements. Lands
beneath navigable waters, as we have seen, were segregated from the
selected area and were not included in the land transferred because,
under the Equal Footing Doctrine, title to those lands had already
passed to the state. Until 1983, the policy of the Department of the
Interior as enunciated by the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") 33 was to include the submerged lands beneath non-navigable
waters in the area conveyed and to charge the selector,34 whether the
state or a Native corporation, for the acreage.
In August of 1983, then Secretary of the Interior James Watt an-
nounced a change in the BLM policy regarding the "chargeability" of
submerged lands. Without preparing an Environmental Impact State-
ment or providing for a period of notice and comment, the Secretary
issued a "change in policy" and "waiver of interim regulations" that
substantially changed the way submerged lands beneath non-navigable
waters were to be charged against the entitlements of both the state
and the Native corporations. 35
33. The Bureau of Land Management is the agency within the Department of the
Interior responsible for the administration of the land selection/conveyance process.
34. 38 Fed. Reg. 14,221 (1973) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 2650.5-1 (1986)).
35. The new policy was promulgated in 48 Fed. Reg. 54,483 (1983). It might be
maintained that the change in policy did not constitute rulemaking subject to the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500, 553 (1982).
Nonetheless, a proposed rulemaking was published subsequently in the Federal Regis-
ter, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,475 (1984), allowing for public comment, and a final rulemaking,
50" Fed. Reg. 15,546 (1985). Arguably, these post-hoc actions cure any procedural
infirmities, but these issues are by no means beyond dispute. See also The Wilderness
Soc'y v. Carruthers, Civ. No. 84-1823 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 1986) (action by two environ-
mental organizations claiming, inter alia, that failure of the Department of the Inte-
rior to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to promulgation of the
Department's new chargeability policy was a violation of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, ANCSA, and the Alaska Statehood Act).
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Under the new policy, the submerged acreage beneath non-navi-
gable lakes in excess of fifty acres and non-navigable streams in excess
of three chains36 in width are no longer charged against state or Native
entitlements. 37 Rather, the BLM is required to follow standard sur-
veying practice as outlined in the Manual of Survey Instructions, 38
according to which "meanderable" 39 bodies of water - that is, all
large bodies of water, whether navigable or not - are segregated from
the area surveyed, and the segregated area is excluded from the area
for purposes of calculating the acreage to be conveyed.4°
The new policy provides that the submerged lands beneath all
meanderable bodies of water are segregated out of the area conveyed
by federal patent. As a result, the ownership of these submerged lands
comes into question.41 Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, land be-
neath navigable bodies of water becomes the property of the new state.
But what of lands beneath water that is not navigable? According to
the present Department position, title to submerged lands beneath
meanderable non-navigable bodies of water passes to the grantee of the
adjacent fastlands by operation of law. The selector is not charged for
the submerged land that, when surveyed, is segregated out of the par-
cel of land conveyed.42 In other words, under the new policy the se-
lector will get the submerged lands free, without having to expend any
entitlement rights.
Although the state, the Native community, and the Department
seem to agree that the submerged acreage is acquired by the selector of
the adjacent fastlands by operation of law, just what law applies to
accomplish this result is unclear. Many argue that the Alaska com-
mon law of riparian rights applies,43 whereas others point to federal
36. A chain is a survey device to measure distance. As used here, it refers to the
traditional length of a Gunther's chain which was 66 feet. Thus, three chains are 198
feet. A modem chain is a metal tape 100 feet long, divided into tenths of a foot
instead of inches.
37. 43 C.F.R. § 2650.5-1(3) (1986).
38. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
SURVEY OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES § 3-115 (1973) [hereinafter
MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS].
39. Meandering refers to the survey practice of following the sinuosities of the
water body; that is, the survey plat delimits the high-water mark of the meandered
water body.
40. See infra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
41. More precisely stated, the question is: Are those submerged lands that are
segregated for the purposes of chargeability also segregated from the area for the pur-
poses of conveyance, and thus not transferred by the grant itself?.
42. MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 38, § 7-51 ("The Govern-
ment's conveyance of title to a fractional subdivision fronting upon a nonnavigable
body of water, unless specific reservations are indicated in the patent, carries owner-
ship to the middle of the bed in front of the basic holding.").
43. See infra text accompanying notes 267-75.
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law, either as borrowing state law, or as provided by federal statute
passed early in this nation's history.44
Whatever the legal theory, the practical effect of the new policy is
a substantial increase in the amount of land to be transferred from
federal ownership in Alaska, a result strongly opposed by many envi-
ronmentalists. 45 By contrast, the Department of the Interior takes the
view that it has simply redefined what is meant by "wet land" for
purposes of calculating chargeability. 46 The Department asserts that
this change was necessary to bring its practices in Alaska into con-
formity with those in the lower forty-eight.47
As many of the selections by both the state and the Native corpo-
rations include numerous large, non-navigable bodies of water, the
practical consequence of the new policy is to increase substantially
both state and Native entitlements to federal lands. Estimates of the
increase range from 783,000 acres to just under 2,000,000 acres.48
Some Native corporations may even be permitted to make additional
selections from "conservation system unit" lands - parks, refuges,
and wilderness areas - protected by the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA").49
44. See infra text accompanying notes 276-300.
45. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Carruthers, Civ. No. 84-1823 (D.D.C. Jan. 30,
1986).
46. See Letter from J. Steven Griles, Ass't Sec'y, United States Department of the
Interior to Hon. James McClure, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, United States Senate (Feb. 6, 1986), reprinted in S. REP. No. 234, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, 5 (1986) [hereinafter Letter to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources].
47. Id. at 6.
48. Memorandum from the Director of the Alaska Department of Natural Re-
sources to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management, Alaska State Office (May
1, 1987). The lower figure is the estimate of the Alaska Department of Natural Re-
sources, and the higher figure is that of the Bureau of Land Management. The differ-
ence between the two estimates is explained by the different assumptions used for the
definition of navigability: the more inclusive the definition, the smaller the conse-
quence of the new policy, since fewer areas of submerged land will be affected. Should
the liberal standard of navigability used in the recent Gulkana River decision, Alaska
v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 455 (D. Alaska 1987) (finding most of the Gulkana
River navigable for title purposes despite BLM determination of non-navigability), be
applied throughout Alaska, it would significiantly decrease the amount of meander-
able but non-navigable water in Alaska.
49. Regarding the availability of areas designated by ANILCA as conservation
system units ("CSUs") for selection by underselected villages, the House report indi-
cates that such statutory protection would probably not preclude selection of such
areas. Specifically the report states:
This section gives the Secretary of the Interior the necessary authority to
withdraw available lands for Village Corporation selection in those instances
where it is determined a Village Corporation has not selected sufficient land
to obtain its full entitlement. The Secretary is to make every effort to rewith-
draw available land for underselected Villages from the original Village and
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Resolution of the two issues of navigability and chargeability will
determine the disposition of potentially millions of acres of valuable
Alaska land. Despite their importance, the legal doctrines relating to
these two issues are not particularly clear. Therefore, their impor-
tance to the controversies over submerged land in Alaska warrants a
more thoughtful consideration.
In particular, two points should be considered. First, with regard
to contests over the federal test of navigability for title purposes, it is
important to recognize that a state may define navigability as it wishes
for its own internal purposes, including the regulation of the uses to
which its waters and the submerged lands beneath them may be put.
Accordingly, the legal battles over ownership of Alaska's submerged
lands may tend to obscure the more basic, and more important, ques-
tion of land use control.
Second, with regard to the chargeability of submerged land be-
neath non-navigable water, the appropriateness of applying Alaska's
riparian rights doctrine to this question so as to favor the owner of the
adjacent uplands is not unassailable. The presence of significant fed-
eral interests in preserving Alaska's natural resources in federal own-
ership may call for a federal rule to protect those interests.
IV. FEDERAL NAVIGABILITY DOCTRINE
A. History and Evolution
The federal test for navigability is, on its face, uncomplicated.
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the language in the test varies ac-
cording to the legal context in which the test is employed. In particu-
lar, courts have used the navigability test to determine federal
maritime jurisdiction, to delimit congressional power under the com-
merce clause to regulate activity on water,50 and to determine title to
deficiency withdrawals. Lands considered available for rewithdrawal would
include all lands within those withdrawals which was [sic] considered public
land and available for withdrawal at the time the ANSCA was passed in
1971, irrespective of classification of the land subsequent to passage of the
ANSCA.
H.R. REP. No. 97, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (1979) (emphasis added).
50. Presently, navigability for commerce clause purposes appears to be waning in
importance as the general commerce power of the Congress has expanded. See, e.g.,
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987) (title to
navigable lake); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)
(jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers to regulate dredge and fill of wetlands not
limited by navigability of surface waters) (see infra notes 84-89 and accompanying
text); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (interstate transfer of
ground water subject to regulation by Congress under the commerce clause).
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submerged lands. Unfortunately, not all of the results of its applica-
tion in those various contexts are readily reconcilable. As one com-
mentator characterized the term: "'Navigable' is a word of art,
perhaps even of sorcery .... The concept is confusing, slippery, un-
predictable, antique, and irrelevant to today's problems." 51
Drawing from the common law in England, early American
courts deemed navigable only water subject to the ebb and flow of the
tides.5 2 This rule reflected the fact that England has few major inland
waters. In 1870, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
conditions on this side of the Atlantic are significantly different from
England with respect to the number and size of inland waterways.
Consequently, the Supreme Court adopted a "navigable-in-fact" test:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water.5
3
Originally, this navigability test applied only to determine the
limits of admiralty jurisdiction. Since then, courts have come to apply
the test in two other areas: to determine the scope of congressional
regulatory powers on water bodies under the commerce clause, and to
settle questions of title to submerged lands. The application of the test
in these contexts is not uniform, however, and the distinctions among
them are often murky.5 4 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the
federal courts have expanded the definition of navigability in order to
encompass the changing uses of America's waters.
1. Admiralty jurisdiction. Under the original Judiciary Act of
1789,55 the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts extended to
"waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more
tons burthen. .... -56 At first, the Supreme Court adhered to the Eng-
lish common law tidal test of navigability in admiralty jurisdiction
cases.5 7 In 1845, Congress enacted a statute extending admiralty juris-
diction to vessels on the Great Lakes of "twenty tons burden and
51. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV., 233, 250 n.66 (1980).
52. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876).
53. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
54. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
55. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1982)).
56. Id. § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
57. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
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upwards ... employed in business of commerce and navigation be-
tween ports and places in different States and Territories upon the
lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes .... -58
In 1851, the Supreme Court examined the question of jurisdiction
in a case involving a collision between the schooner Cuba and the
steamship Genesee Chief on Lake Ontario. The Court rejected the
English tidal test and held that there was federal jurisdiction to hear
the case.59 The Court did not, however, formulate an alternative defi-
nition of navigability. Neither did it simply uphold the constitutional
authority of Congress to extend by statute the admiralty jurisdiction of
the federal courts to include the Great Lakes. Rather, the Court held
that such jurisdiction existed over those and other navigable, non-tidal
waters throughout the nation due to their public nature. 60 The Court
based its conclusion on the view that, under English law, it was the
public use of certain waters, rather than the influence of the tides upon
them, that established navigability. 61 In the opinion, the Court noted
that "[i]n England... tide-water and navigable water are synonymous
terms, and tide-water, with a few small and unimportant exceptions,
meant nothing more than public rivers, as contradistinguished from
private ones. .... -62
Continuing its logic, the Court held the public nature of navigable
waters was the basis for its jurisdiction in admiralty over them. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[i]f the water was navigable it was deemed to be
public; and if public, was regarded as within the legitimate scope of the
admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. '63
Based on this holding in the Genesee Chief, the Supreme Court
developed in an 1870 case, The Daniel Ball, 64 the navigability-in-fact
test used today. The Daniel Ball decision extended federal admiralty
jurisdiction to include the Grand River, a navigable river wholly
within the State of Michigan which flows into Lake Michigan. In con-
trast to the tidal test, the Court deemed this flexible, case-by-case ap-
proach better suited to the extensive public use of American waters for
commercial navigation in inland, non-tidal areas.65
58. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1873 (1982)) (emphasis added).
59. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 456 (1851).
60. Id. at 457.
61. Id. at 455.
62. Id..
63. Id. at 457.
64. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); see supra notes 52-54 and
accompanying text.
65. The Court stated:
The doctrine of the common law as to the navigability of waters has no
application in this country. Here the ebb and flow of the tide do not consti-
tute the usual test, as in England, or any test at all of the navigability of
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The furthest reach of admiralty jurisdiction based on navigability
was in The Robert Parsons,66 a 1903 Supreme Court case. In that case,
the Court extended its admiralty jurisdiction to a horse drawn barge
solely engaged in intrastate commerce on the Erie Canal, a water body
made navigable by artificial means. The Court based its decision on
the fact that the Erie Canal "form[s] .. . a continuous highway for
commerce .... ,"67
This brief history reveals that the central principle applied by the
Court in extending its admiralty jurisdiction to cover waters previ-
ously considered non-navigable was not the potential use of such wa-
ters for interstate commerce, but rather their public nature as avenues
for interstate and intrastate trade and travel.
2. Commerce Clause Jurisdiction. The public nature of navigable
waters also has been central to the Supreme Court's analysis in delim-
iting Congress' commerce clause jurisdiction. In the landmark case of
Gibbons v. Ogden, 68 Chief Justice Marshall affirmed one of the tradi-
tional constitutional bases of the power of Congress to legislate in the
area of interstate commerce by holding that "commerce" includes
navigation. Thus, when the State of New York attempted to issue a
license that purported to grant exclusive rights to commerce on a navi-
gable waterway contrary to a federal license, the Court held that the
New York license was invalid. 69 As the Supreme Court explained in
the subsequent case of Gilman v. Philadelphia,70 the constitutional
power to regulate commerce implies a public interest in and legislative
jurisdiction over navigable waters:
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce
comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent neces-
sary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are ac-
cessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For this
purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all
the requisite legislation by Congress. 71
waters.... Some of our rivers are as navigable for many hundreds of miles
above as they are below the limits of tide water, and some of them are navi-
gable for great distances by large vessels, which are not even affected by the
tide at any point during their entire length. A different test must, therefore,
be applied to determine the navigability of our rivers, and that is found in
their navigable capacity.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
66. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
67. Id. at 26; for comments on the "highway" test, see infra notes 107-111 and
accompanying text.
68. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
69. Id. at 239-40.
70. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
71. Id. at 724-25.
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In addition to underpinning Congress' commerce clause jurisdic-
tion, the right of the public to use navigable waterways for navigation
gives rise to what is referred to as a navigational servitude. 72 Under
this doctrine, any property interest in lands beneath navigable waters
is held subject to the public right of navigation.
Whatever the nature of the interest of a riparian owner in the sub-
merged lands in front of his upland bordering on a public navigable
water, his title is not as full and complete as his title to fast land
which has no direct connection with the navigation of such water.
It is a qualified title, a bare technical title, not at his absolute dispo-
sal, as is his upland, but to be held at all times subordinate to such
use of the submerged lands and of the waters flowing over them as
may be consistent with or demanded by the public right of
navigation.73
Because riparian landholders adjacent to navigable waters own
subject to a navigational servitude, the Supreme Court has ruled that
even intensive regulation of the uses of such riparian lands and waters
does not constitute a "taking" of private property without due process
of law.74 The cases that-apply the definition of navigability for com-
merce clause purposes typically involve a challenge by a riparian
owner to federal regulation of the uses of his adjacent submerged
lands. These challenges fall into two subcategories: those in which
the plaintiff contests a regulation as beyond the jurisdiction of Con-
gress (Congress lacks constitutional authority for its action), and those
claiming that, while lawful, the regulation entails a "taking" that re-
quires either compensation or nullification of the regulation. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Appalachian Power,75 the United States
sought to enjoin construction of a dam by the defendant power com-
pany on the ground that it was an impediment to navigation prohib-
ited by the Rivers and Harbors Act.76 The Court noted that the power
of the United States to regulate commerce upon its waters "is as broad
as the needs of commerce."' 77 Justice Reed added that:
The flow of a navigable stream is in no sense private property; "that
the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private
72. See, e.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956).
73. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900) (emphasis added); see also Gib-
son v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897).
74. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950) ("When
the Government exercises this servitude, it is exercising its paramount power in the
interest of navigation, rather than taking the private property of anyone."); see also
United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, -- U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1487, 1490
(1987); United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592,
596-97 (1941).
75. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
76. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, §§ 9, 10, 30 Stat.
1151 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1982)).
77. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 426.
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ownership is inconceivable." Exclusion of riparian owners from its
benefits without compensation is entirely within the Government's
discretion. 78
Two recent cases illustrate current trends in the relationship of
navigability to commerce clause jurisdiction. In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 79 the Supreme Court drove a wedge between the tradi-
tionally linked navigational servitude and the power of Congress to
regulate navigation. 80 The case involved the private development of a
previously non-navigable lagoon into a navigable marina. The Army
Corps of Engineers insisted that the marina be open for use by the
general public. The Supreme Court affirmed the power of the Corps to
require public access to the marina, 81 with the proviso that if such
access were to be required, the federal government would have to in-
voke its power of eminent domain and pay just compensation. 82
Although this factual situation is unusual, the holding indicates that
the old rule that imposing a navigational servitude involves no consti-
tutional taking is no longer sacrosanct. 83
The second case, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 8 4 in-
volved a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers under
the Clean Water Act8 5 to regulate dredge and fill operations in an area
of land beneath non-navigable waters. The developer directed the at-
tention of the court to the specific language in the Clean Water Act
amendments of 1972 which indicate that the Act applies to "navigable
waters."' 86 The Court ruled, however, that the jurisdiction of the
Corps was not limited by the navigability of the surface waters, but
rather extended to all "waters of the United States," according to the
statutory definition of "navigable waters" under the Clean Water
Act.87 The legislative history of the Clean Water Act Amendments
showed that Congress expected the reach of the Act to be to the fullest
78. Id. at 424 (citation omitted).
79. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
80. See generally Gelin, No Surprises Please: The Quest for Certainty in the Appli-
cation of the Navigational Servitude as an Illusion, 18 LAND & NAT. RESOURCES Div.
J. 2, 12-13 (1981).
81. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174.
82. Id. at 180.
83. In particular, the Court noted that public access would "result in an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina," id. and that the conduct of the
federal officials had led to "the fruition of a number of expectancies ... that, if suffi-
ciently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes over the
management of the landowner's property," id. at 179.
84. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
85. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
86. Id. §§ 1311, 1344, 1362.
87. See id. § 1362(7); Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131 ("these findings
establish that respondent's property is a wetland adjacent to a navigable waterway
.... it is part of the 'waters of the United States'....").
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extent possible.88 Accordingly, the Court did not confine the Corps'
jurisdiction to navigable waters under the traditional federal defini-
tion, but upheld the regulation of the wetlands at issue under the more
expansive reach of the commerce clause.89
The opinions of the Supreme Court in these and other recent
cases may indicate that the expansion of legislative jurisdiction under
the commerce clause has reached the point as to eliminate the signifi-
cance of navigability for commerce clause purposes.90 There is, how-
ever, no universal consensus on this point, and debate continues over
the continued importance of navigability for commerce clause pur-
poses.91 In any event, it is important to note that the courts construe
the navigability test more broadly in commerce clause cases than in
admiralty jurisdiction or title cases.
3. Title to Submerged Lands. The issue of the public nature of
navigable waters arose in the title context even before the cases involv-
ing ownership of submerged lands under the Equal Footing Doc-
trine.92 In 1842, for example, a dispute over rights to oyster beds in
Raritan Bay in New Jersey precipitated a suit in ejectment by a ripa-
rian owner who derived his title from an English royal grant.93 The
defendant asserted his right to use the beds under an 1824 state statute
88. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp.
685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (discussing congressional intent behind the Clean Water Act).
89. Interestingly, no case was cited to support this expansive view of the Corps'
jurisdiction, nor was any explanation given of a constitutional theory to support the
Corps' permit system. Rather, the Court saw the issue purely as one of statutory
interpretation, to be decided "[p]urged of its spurious constitutional overtones." Riv-
erside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 129. The Court's logic appears to be that, because
denial of a permit would not constitute a taking, the only issue left to decide was the
interpretation of the interchangeable use of "navigable waters" and "waters of the
United States" in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(12) (1982). But
the definition adopted by Congress, and its implied assertion of jurisdiction, is not per
se necessarily a constitutional declaration of the reach of its powers. The expanded
jurisdiction of the Corps was upheld in Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D.
Wyo. 1977).
90. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
91. For example, the language of Riverside Bayview Homes is ambiguous on this
point. In that case, the Court wrote that "these findings establish that respondent's
property is a wetland adjacent to a navigable waterway.... it is part of the 'waters of
the United States'...." 474 U.S. at 131. But the phrase "adjacent to a navigable
waterway" may be interpreted several ways. It may imply that some nexus with the
navigable waterway is still required. Alternatively, it may mean that the Act applies
to all "waters of the United States," as the statutory definition would seem to imply.
92. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Utah,
283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-
Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
93. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
authorizing private use of the submerged lands of the bay for raising
oysters. The United States Supreme Court upheld the right of the de-
fendant oysterman on the grounds that the English Crown could not
convey title to the submerged lands at issue. Rather, title remained in
the New Jersey state government to use as it saw fit. This holding
became an underpinning for the later Equal Footing Doctrine cases, in
that it established the specific rights each state derived as sovereign of
its territory. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney explained:
For when the Revolution took place, the people of each state be-
came themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their
own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by
the Constitution to the general government. 94
At least two modern commentators have shown that Justice Ta-
ney was probably incorrect in his view that the English crown was
powerless to convey the submerged lands into private ownership. 95
Nevertheless, the case established henceforth each state's right to own-
ership in its sovereign capacity of the submerged lands beneath naviga-
ble waters within its borders and the right of the public to use the
navigable waters and the submerged lands for their common benefit.
It was a short step from this ruling to the requirement under the Equal
Footing Doctrine that upon admission to the Union each state has title
to the submerged lands beneath all the navigable waters within its
borders. 96
Following the pattern of the early admiralty jurisdiction cases,
the test for navigability applied initially in these early title cases was
the English tidal test.97 As in admiralty cases, the courts eventually
adopted the navigability-in-fact test in title cases as well. 98 It was not,
however, until the 1920's that the Supreme Court finally settled that
navigability in title cases between a state and the United States over
94. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
95. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Histori-
cal Development, Current Importance and Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 589-90 (1975); Rosen, Public and Private Ownership Rights
in Lands Under Navigable Waters: The Governmental/Proprietary Distinction, 34 U.
FLA. L. REV. 561, 572-74 (1982). Both are thorough and scholarly treatments of the
navigability issue.
96. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-29 (1845). It can be
argued that Pollard's Lessee was wrongly decided, in that the sovereign power to con-
trol the use of navigable waters and the submerged lands beneath is legally distinct
from their ownership by the state.
97. See, e.g., id. at 218.
98. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876).
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submerged lands was a federal question to be decided by the federal
test.99
B. Modem Federal Navigability Doctrine
1. The Test for Title Purposes. In order to be deemed navigable
under federal law, the Daniel Ball test requires that the waters in ques-
tion be "used, or... susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condi-
tion, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water."' 00 As currently applied, this test may be broken down into
five key elements that relate to five specific aspects of the water body in
question, the first implied from the Equal Footing Doctrine, the others
explicit in the Daniel Ball language.
a. Measured at the time of statehood. To ascertain whether the
submerged lands in question vested in the state under the Equal Foot-
ing Doctrine, a court must determine the navigability of the surface
water at issue as of the time the state was admitted into the Union. 1
The condition of the water at the time of the suit is irrelevant. 10 2
b. Susceptible of being used. The Daniel Ball test refers to waters
"used, or .. . susceptible of being used," for trade and travel on
water.10 3 From this reference, the courts have developed a two-step
test in title cases. The first step is an analysis of historical and contem-
porary evidence of actual use of the waterway at the time of admission
to statehood. If such historical documentation is unavailable or in-
complete, the court then considers empirical evidence regarding the
geography of the waterway to determine its capability for use as a
means of transportation and commerce. For example, in ruling for the
State of Utah on a question of title to submerged lands beneath the
upper portions of the Colorado River, the Supreme Court outlined this
two-step evaluation process in a consideration of the susceptibility of
the waterway for navigation. The specific language of the Court may
99. No Supreme Court case had expressly addressed the issue until the three cases
decided between 1921 and 1931: Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260
U.S. 77 (1922); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); and United
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931). Before that line of cases, most state courts as-
sumed that title to submerged land was a question to be decided by state law, even if it
involved a claim by the United States. Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and
Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 8-9 (1967).
100. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
101. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); Oklahoma v Texas, 258
U.S. 574 (1922).
103. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
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be relevant to determine navigability in sparsely populated areas in
Alaska:
The question of that susceptibility in the ordinary condition of the
rivers, rather than of the mere manner or extent of actual use, is the
crucial question. The Government insists that the uses of the rivers
have been more of a private nature than of a public, commercial
sort. But, assuming this to be the fact, it cannot be regarded as
controlling when the rivers are shown to be capable of commercial
use. The extent of existing commerce is not the test. The evidence of
the actual use of streams, and especially of extensive and continued
use for commercial purposes, may be most persuasive, but where
conditions of exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or
limited nature of such use, the susceptibility to use as a highway of
commerce may still be satisfactorily proved ...
Utah, with its equality of right as a State of the Union, is not to
be denied title to the beds of such of its rivers as were navigable in
fact at the time of the admission of the State either because the loca-
tion of the rivers and the circumstances of the exploration and set-
tlement of the country through which they flowed had made
recourse to navigation a late adventure, or because commercial utili-
zation on a large scale awaits future demands.1 4
In the Alaska context, then, the courts may well find many waterways
navigable as a matter of law, even though as a matter of fact there is
no evidence of commercial use. The critical factor is the susceptibility
of such use.
c. In its ordinary condition. The Daniel Ball test expressly refers
to the capability of the waters for navigation "in their ordinary condi-
tion." 10 5 This element of the test contains an inherent semantic confu-
sion. Does "ordinary" refer to their usual condition, or to the natural,
unimproved condition? In Alaska many of the bodies of water at issue
are frozen for most of the year, and some even remain frozen the year
round. Therefore, this distinction between usual and natural could
make a considerable difference to the disposition of submerged land in
Alaska.
The Supreme Court has used this distinction to differentiate the
application of the test in two of the contexts in which the test for navi-
gability is used: title purposes and commerce clause purposes. The
navigability test for commerce clause purposes permits a court to con-
sider improvements in a waterway that aid navigability, whereas, for
104. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82-83 (1931) (emphasis added); see also
The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874) ("The capability of use by the public
for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the naviga-
bility of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use.").
105. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
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title purposes, the test is applied to the waterway in its unimproved
state. 106
d. As a highway for commerce. The fourth major element of the
Daniel Ball test is the evaluation of the waters as "highways for com-
merce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted."' 07 The
Supreme Court emphasized this factor in its ruling in Utah v. United
States 105 on the navigability of the Great Salt Lake to determine own-
ership of its submerged lands. The evidence presented in the Master's
Report indicated that most of the transportation on the waters of the
lake took place before the date of statehood, and involved flatboats
used by ranchers either for carrying livestock from one section of up-
land to another or to and from certain islands. In the words of the
Court, "the business of the boats was ranching and not carrying water-
borne freight."' 0 9 Nonetheless, the Court went on to say, "[w]e think
that is an irrelevant detail. The lake was used as a highway and that is
the gist of the federal test."110 Applying the "highways for commerce"
element of the test, the Court held the lake to be navigable because, at
the time of statehood, the water could have afforded passage to boats
in general use on inland navigable bodies of water. Consequently, the
Court held that title to the submerged lands beneath the Great Salt
Lake had vested in the State of Utah."'
e. In the customary modes of trade and travel on water. The lan-
guage used in the Master's Report in the Great Salt Lake case reflects
the thrhst of the fifth element of the Daniel Ball test regarding "cus-
tomary modes of trade and travel on water."' 1 2 This element was the
focus of recent litigation in the federal district court in Alaska involv-
ing Slopbucket Lake, a small lake in Alaska accessible only by float-
plane. 113 The State of Alaska asserted that, despite its isolation and
lack of use for commercial boating, the lake was nonetheless navigable
for title purposes. In support of its position, the state directed the
court to an early navigability case in which the Supreme Court wrote
106. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text; see also Economy Light &
Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 118 (1921).
107. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
108. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971).
109. Id. at 11.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
113. Alaska v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d
851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985). The name of the lake derives from
the practice of those who camp on a small ithsmus between two lakes, one of which
was substantially larger than the other. The larger was kept pristine, the smaller being
used for the dumping of its namesake. 754 F.2d at 852.
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that a river was navigable in fact "[i]f it [is] capable in its natural state
of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the
commerce may be conducted... ,, 14
The district court judge concluded, however, that floatplane use
was not a "customary mode of trade and travel on water" and, conse-
quently, irrelevant to the determination of navigability.' 1 5 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the
district court, but focused on the "highways" element rather than the
"customary modes" element of the navigability test. The appellate
court said that the lake served as "a terminus or launching point for
floatplanes, not 'a channel for useful commerce.' The floatplanes go to
and from the lake; they do not travel on the water. ' 16
For a waterway to be held navigable under federal law for title
purposes it must satisfy each of these five elements of the Daniel Ball
formulation. The determination in federal law whether a body of
water is navigable for commerce clause purposes differs from the test
for title purposes in several important respects.
2. The Test of Navigability for Commerce Clause Pur-
poses. Although both the commerce clause and title tests use the lan-
guage of The Daniel Ball, there are certain distinctions between the
two as applied in particular cases. These distinctions must be kept in
mind because precedential cases in one context may not be applicable
to the other.
First, the commerce clause navigability test is applied as of the
time of the suit, not as of the time of admission to statehood. 17 In-
deed, a waterway that was non-navigable at the time of admission of a
state may later be found navigable for commerce clause purposes."18
Second, an affirmative determination of commerce clause navigability
is indelible: once a body of water has been determined to be navigable
and thus subject to regulation by Congress, subsequent changes in the
character of the water body have no effect on the extent of congres-
sional jurisdiction."19
114. Id. at 1227 (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874)
(emphasis added)).
115. "[Fjloatplane activities on Slopbucket Lake are not modes of conducting com-
merce on water for the purpose of determining navigability for title. Such activities
are legally irrelevant to the navigability determination." Id. at 1228.
116. Alaska v. United States, 754 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
968 (1985) (citation omitted).
117. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940).




Third, and most important, the commerce clause test is more in-
clusive than the test for title purposes because it allows for "improve-
ments" that render navigable an otherwise non-navigable waterway.
As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Appalachian Elec-
tric Power Co., "[t]he power of Congress over commerce is not to be
hampered because of the necessity for reasonable improvements to
make an interstate waterway available for traffic." 120
These three differences between the two tests may be particularly
important in Alaska, where unique circumstances strain the parame-
ters of the traditional definition of navigability and where such large
areas of submerged lands are at stake. Yet, in a recent Interior Board
of Land Appeals case involving a river in Alaska, this distinction was
overlooked. The case involved the navigability for title purposes of the
Matanuska River, used mainly for white water rafting. In his opinion,
the Administrative Law Judge cited inapposite commerce clause cases
to support a questionable ruling on title, that the river was navigable,
and, thus, the submerged land was state owned. 121
It should be noted that the position asserted by the United States
regarding the navigability of a water body varies depending upon the
particular legal posture of each case. When the issue involves naviga-
bility for title purposes, the United States typically takes the position
that the waterway is not navigable, and hence, title to the submerged
lands did not vest in the state under the Equal Footing Doctrine, but
rather remains in the United States. 122 In commerce clause cases, by
contrast, the United States usually attempts to show the opposite -
that the waterway is navigable - to establish congressional jurisdic-
tion over the waterway. 123
3. The Unique Alaska Context. In addition to the complexities
already explored, the application of the traditional definition of navi-
gability in the Alaska context raises further questions. What, for in-
stance, is the "ordinary" condition of a body of water that is frozen
much of the year? Should a court factor in the portion of the year that
the water is liquid? Are frozen bodies of water nonetheless "suscepti-
ble" to navigation, since boats would float on the water when not
frozen?
Also, most of Alaska's inland lakes are in very remote areas, ac-
cessible only by floatplane. Many have never been used by traditional
120. Id.
121. Interior Board Land Appeals Op. No. 82-1133 (August 18, 1983). This opin-
ion by the Administrative Law Judge has not been adopted by the Department of the
Interior.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940);
Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
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watercraft such as boats or canoes. Should a court consider the inher-
ent navigability of a water body independent of its isolation? In what
sense would such a water body be "susceptible" of navigation if, for all
practical purposes, commercial navigation is impossible?
Moreover, in Alaska, frozen stream and river beds are often used
for travel by dog sled and snowmobile. Are such forms of locomotion
"customary modes of trade and travel on water"? These are typical
questions that arise in trying to apply the traditional navigability cri-
teria to the unique circumstances found in Alaska.
Recognizing its unique position, the State of Alaska has been
quite aggressive in asserting a much more inclusive definition of navi-
gability than that typically applied by the BLM. The cases being
brought by the state seek to stretch the traditional definition of naviga-
bility to cover new circumstances not contemplated by the Supreme
Court in The Daniel Ball. The state has claimed, for example, that
both floatplane and dogsled are "commerce" for purposes of title navi-
gability, though the relevance of floatplane use was recently decided
adversely to the state.' 24 It remains to be seen how the courts will
interpret these issues.125 Although it may not be readily apparent, in
deciding such cases, courts are in fact dealing with much more funda-
mental jurisprudential questions. For example, should water and sub-
merged lands as natural resources be opened to private ownership and
exploitation, or should they remain protected for public use and
enjoyment? 126
V. THE ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE
WATERS DISTINCTION
In the broader context of the jurisprudential relationship between
the individual and the state pertaining to waters and submerged lands,
the concept of navigability has played a key role. Reduced to its fun-
damentals, the distinction between navigable and non-navigable wa-
ters is that navigable waters are "public" and non-navigable waters are
124. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
125. Recently much of the Gulkana River was deemed navigable, on the erroneous
theory that the phrase "trade and travel" on water in the federal definition uses a
disjunctive "or," allowing a finding of navigability to be based entirely upon the
water's capability to sustain travel only, without any other potential commercial use.
Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455 (D. Alaska 1987).
126. An additional hurdle facing the state on the issue of title to submerged lands
arose in the case of Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands,
461 U.S. 273 (1983). In Block the Supreme Court held that state claims to submerged
land could only be brought under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (1982),
and such claims were subject to laches and a 12-year statute of limitations. In 1986,
Congress removed this obstacle with the creation of a statutory exception to this stat-
ute of limitations solely for Alaska lands claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1982).
[Vol. 5:69
SUBMERGED LANDS
"private." 12 7 One court has noted that "[t]he division of waters into
navigable and nonnavigable is but a way of dividing them into public
and private waters, - a classification which, in some form, every civi-
lized nation has recognized .... ,"128
The public nature of navigable waters derives from two principles
of early Roman law: dominium and imperium. Dominium referred to
proprietary ownership, imperium to the authority of the Roman state
to control, among other things, the use of certain lands and waters. 129
Roman law perceived the state as having the requisite imperium to
exercise regulatory control over navigable waters, but not over those
that were non-navigable. Navigable waters were considered common
to all and the property (dominium) of none. 130 As Justice Frankfurter
explained in his dissenting opinion in United States v. California con-
cerning the ownership of California's tidelands: "To speak of 'domin-
ion' carries precisely those overtones in the law which relate to
property and not to political authority. Dominion, from the Roman
concept of dominium, was concerned with property and ownership, as
against imperium, which related to political sovereignty."' 131
Under this principle of Roman law, the government operates in
two different capacities with respect to land use: as landowner exercis-
ing dominium and as land regulator exercising imperium. 132 Under
Roman law, natural resources were considered to be common to all, as
"res communes." As stated in the Institutes of Justinian: "By the law
of nature then the following things are common to all men; air, run-
ning water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea." 133 The
seas and their shores were considered to be held in common, and
hence their use was regulated by the state, but they could not be sub-
ject to jus privatus or private ownership. Furthermore, this concept of
res communes implied usufructuary rights in the public Gus publicum)
to these resources.13 4
127. See 1 R. CLARK, S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, W. HUTCHINS, C. MARTZ, S. SATO,
& A. STONE, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.4(A) (Ist ed. 1967) [hereinafter
CLARK].
128. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 199, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893).
129. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 43-44 (1947).
130. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 475 (1970) (quoting R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF
ROMAN LAW, 109-10 (4th ed. 1956)).
131. 332 U.S. at 43-44.
132. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915); see also Kleppe v.
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) ("Congress exercises the powers both of a
proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain.").
133. JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES § 2.1.1 (J.T. Abdy & B. Walker trans. 1876).
134. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 393
N.E.2d 356 (1979). "The jus privatum/jus publicum distinction in regard to shore-
land property was carried over to the new world, so that the company's ownership
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The English common law has assimilated these Roman law con-
cepts. Borrowing from the Roman notion of resources "common to
all" or "res communes," Lord Bracton declared the shores of the sea
to be "common to all" and inalienable.1 35 In pre-feudal England,
property law was uncomplicated. Ownership was complete and sus-
tained by right of arms.136 The English crown had exclusive rights to
all the property it owned, subject to no public rights. Indeed, property
rights emanated solely from the sovereign, and the common law re-
quired that all property be owned by someone in particular.1 37 Rights
in the public in general were unheard of in early times.
With a small provision in the Magna Carta, however, the notion
developed that crown ownership was subject to certain public rights.
Chapter 33 of the original Charter of 1215 required the removal of
"fish-weirs" from the bottoms of large rivers. 38 Fish-weirs were fish
traps permanently fixed to the river bottom at the mouth. They
greatly reduced upstream fishing and interfered with navigation. 139
This unassuming provision in the Magna Carta banning fish-weirs
spawned the more general principle that a grant of submerged lands
by the king did not confer an exclusive right of fishery to the grantee.
Rather, the grant was subject to a right to fish, held in common by the
public.
Eventually, these public usufructuary rights to fish evolved into a
doctrine that the sovereign held title to the lands beneath navigable
waters in two capacities. The first of these capacities was as the gov-
ernmental authority charged with the duty to protect public usufruc-
tuary rights in fishing and navigation (us publicum). The second was
as the proprietary owner of the submerged lands with all of the attend-
ant rights of a private landowner (us privatum), subject to the rights
of the public.14°
was understood to consist of a jus privatum which could be 'parcelled out to corpora-
tions and individuals... as private property' and a jus publicum 'in trust for public
use of all those who should become inhabitants of said territory....'" Id. at 633-34,
393 N.E.2d at 359 (quoting Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray)
451, 483-84 (1857)).
135. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S.
Thorne trans. 1968). This assertion of their inalienability was recently called into
question. See Rosen, supra note 95.
136. Rosen, supra note 95, at 564.
137. Id. at 565 n.20.
138. See generally J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (1965). For a thorough, scholarly,
and insightful treatment of the development of the law of navigability, see MacGrady,
supra note 95.
139. Rosen, supra note 95, at 565-66 n.25.
140. "[Tjhejusprivatum of the owner or proprietor is charged with and subject to
that jus publicum which belongs to the King's subjects; as the soil of an highway is,
which though in point of property it may be a private man's freehold, yet it is charged
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Following British common law, in the American Colonies a land-
owner's title was not exclusive where the water was navigable, but was
subject to public usufructuary rights.141 As Chief Justice Taney wrote
in Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, "the previous habits and usages of the
colonists have been respected, and they have been accustomed to enjoy
in common, the benefits and advantages of the navigable waters for the
same purposes, and to the same extent, that they have been used and
enjoyed for centuries in England."1 42 By contrast, lands beneath non-
navigable waters were held without being subject to any rights in the
public.' 43
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had
characterized this distinction as giving rise to a "public trust" in lands
beneath navigable waters. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illi-
nois,14 4 generally regarded as the seminal case in this area, the
Supreme Court invalidated an act of the Illinois legislature transfer-
ring title to submerged lands beneath a navigable portion of Lake
Michigan to a railroad company. The Court voided the grant on the
grounds that the state was powerless to alienate the submerged lands
to the detriment of the public interest.1 45
This so-called "Public Trust Doctrine" has been persuasively
championed by Professor Sax, a legal scholar in the area of natural
resource law.146 Unfortunately, the doctrine has been misunderstood,
partly owing to Sax's rather cavalier expansion of it. Although Profes-
sor Sax and others have sought to couch the Public Trust Doctrine in
with a public interest of the people, which may not be prejudiced or damnified." M.
HALE, DE JURE MARIS (1786), quoted in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894); see
also Wilson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. ENVT'L.
AFF. L. Rv. 839, 844 (1984).
141. Whether state or federal law controls on the title to submerged lands beneath
non-navigable bodies of water adjacent to a federal grant is open to question. See infra
text accompanying notes 250-51.
142. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 414 (1842).
143. E.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). In this case, the New Jersey court
recognized that submerged lands in England were owned mostly by private persons,
but nonetheless declared that under English common law "navigable waters in which
the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the
water and the land under the water... are common to all the citizens, and ... the
property... is vested in the sovereign.., not for his own use, but for the use of the
citizen." Id. at 76-77; see Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
For an extensive discussion of the possible misconceptions in the Public Trust Doc-
trine deriving from this case, see Rosen, supra note 95, at 571-72.
144. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
145. Id. at 453. This assumption is open to question. See generally Rosen, supra
note 95.
146. The seminal article on this topic is Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
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administrative law terms, 14 7 strictly as a matter of property law the
doctrine applies only to submerged lands beneath navigable waters
and a state's trust duties under the doctrine is a matter of state, not
federal, common law. 148 Neither does the doctrine prohibit the aliena-
tion of all lands beneath navigable waters. Rather, it only requires
that the sale be in the public interest, in whatever way a state may
choose to define that term. 149 While there may be a general trust duty
in the federal government toward its public lands, such a doctrine can-
not be implied from the holding in Illinois Central. 150
To sum up, in each of the three lines of cases that hinge upon a
definition of navigability - determining admiralty jurisdiction, delim-
iting the reach of the commerce clause, and settling questions of title
to submerged lands - the distinction between navigable and non-nav-
igable waters reflects a basic distinction between public versus private
rights. The public nature of navigable waters results in the following
five consequences at the federal level:
1. Admiralty jurisdiction lies in the federal courts;
2. Title to submerged lands is in the state as sovereign;
3. The submerged lands are burdened with a public trust;
4. A navigational servitude attaches;
5. Congress may regulate under the commerce clause.
Each of these five legal consequences reflects the public nature of navi-
gable waters. This public nature distinguishes them from waters that
are non-navigable and hence "private" under the federal definitions.
The Public Trust Doctrine upheld in Illinois Central provides an
important linchpin in linking two aspects of the "publicness" of the
submerged lands beneath navigable waters: ownership by the state
147. "Sax reasoned that the public trust doctrine tests the validity of government
action as a matter of administrative law, rather than as a question of res communes
property doctrine." Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some
Historic Property Cases about the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 761, 811 (1979).
148. See CLARK, supra note 127, § 36.4(A).
149. For one state's treatment of alienation of submerged lands subject to a public
trust, see State v. Superior Court of Lake County, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172
Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied sub nom. Lyon v. California, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162
Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied sub nom. Santa Fe Improvement Co. v. City of Berkeley,
449 U.S. 840 (1980); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970); Amigos de Bolsa Chica, Inc. v. Signal Properties, Inc., 142 Cal.
App. 3d, 190 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1983), appeal dismissed, - Cal. 3d -, 734 P.2d 987,
236 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1987); Orange County v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 825 (1973). The Public Trust Doctrine as applied to submerged lands beneath
navigable waters is to be distinguished from the federal doctrine involving a duty to
protect and preserve the public lands. See Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior,
376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
150. For a provocative discussion of Sax's treatment of the Public Trust Doctrine
as administrative rather than property law, see Coquillette, supra note 147.
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and usufructuary rights in the public. The Court held that state own-
ership of submerged lands beneath navigable waters must be for the
purpose of providing public use and benefit. 151 But state ownership is
not the only means of protecting the usufructuary rights of the public.
Although both state ownership and public usufructuary rights follow
from a finding of navigability, they are analytically distinct. Unfortu-
nately, in the current grab for land in Alaska, the distinction between
these two concepts has been obscured. As we have seen, under the
Equal Footing Doctrine, submerged lands beneath navigable waters
are owned by the state in trust for the people. Interestingly, however,
to protect public usufructuary rights, the state need not own the sub-
merged lands, nor is it constrained to adopt the federal test for naviga-
bility, but may fashion its own.
VI. STATE NAVIGABILITY DOCTRINE
Under state law, as under federal law, navigability serves gener-
ally to divide those waters and submerged lands in which the public
has state-enforced usufructuary rights and those which are subject to
private ownership and control. 152 Thus, determination of navigability
under state law separates "public" waters from "private" waters with
attendant consequences for the submerged lands.
153
A. The Four State Legal Contexts
With the exception of admiralty jurisdiction, which is entirely
within the purview of federal law, the contexts in which navigability
plays a key role at the federal law level have analogues in state law: to
resolve questions of title to submerged lands and to delimit state legis-
lative jurisdiction. In addition to those two contexts, at the state level
navigability analysis is relevant in two other legal contexts: first, pub-
lic usufructuary rights and the Public Trust Doctrine. It should be
noted that although these four uses of navigablity under state law are
interrelated, they are nevertheless conceptually distinct. Second, as
under federal law, definitions of navigability at the state level may vary
depending upon the particular context in which the analysis is
employed.
151. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892).
152. See Comment, Water Recreation - Public Use of "Private" Waters, 52 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 171 (1964).
153. See, e.g., Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893); see also
Webb v. Board of Comm'rs of Neosho County, 124 Kan. 38, 40, 257 P. 966, 967
(1927). "The terms 'public waters' and 'navigable waters' are ordinarily synonymous.
The term 'private waters' is ordinarily used to designate nonnavigable waters." Id.
(quoting Piazzek v. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson County, 119 Kan. 119, 237 P.




Prior to the twentieth century, there was a simple correlation in
most states among navigability, title ownership, state regulatory juris-
diction, and public usufructuary rights. Typically, lands beneath navi-
gable waters were owned by the state subject to state legislative
regulation, and public usufructuary rights in navigable waters were
protected by the state courts. 154 By contrast, if a water body was not
navigable, title to the submerged lands was in the riparian owner; the
state legislature had no authority to regulate, and the private owner
was able to prevent the public from trespassing on his property. As
public uses of state waters became more extensive, state courts' rulings
regarding the legal significance of navigability created distinctions
among the four contexts. Unfortunately, all too often the courts cre-
ated more confusion than they resolved. 155
1. Title to Submerged Lands. Prior to the Brewer-Holt-Utah line
of cases, most states considered navigability for title purposes to be a
question of state law.156 Today, it is settled that federal law controls
on the issue of the extent of submerged land beneath navigable waters
that passes to the state upon statehood, 157 and state law controls on
questions of subsequent ownership. 58 In most states, navigability di-
vides those water bodies, the submerged lands of which are owned by
the state, from those owned by the riparian. ' 9 For example, in Colo-
rado, title to land under non-navigable lakes and streams is vested in
the proprietors of the adjacent lands. These proprietors legally may
exclude from such bodies of water members of the public who wish to
use them for recreational purposes. 160
154. CLARK, supra note 127, § 36.4(A).
155. Johnson and Austin note in this regard, "There are probably few areas of law
in which similar problems have arisen in the several states where the courts have split
so widely, or based their decisions on such diverse theories. Furthermore, there is
often little, if any reference by the courts of one state to the decisions on similar issues
in other states." Johnson & Austin, supra note 99, at 34.
156. See supra notes 22 and 92 and accompanying text.
157. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363
(1977); see also Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
158. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1957), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 826 (1958). According to the Minnesota Supreme Court:
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that what Minnesota owned in its sovereign
capacity as a state upon admission to the Union and what was retained by
the United States as part of the public domain clearly involves a Federal
question. Whatever we may have assumed the law to be prior to United
States v. Holt State Bank ... it is clear that since that decision the waters
over which Minnesota may assert ownership as an incident of statehood due
to their navigability must be determined under Federal law.
Id. at 559, 89 N.W.2d at 686 (emphasis added).
159. See CLARK, supra note 127, § 42.2(B).
160. People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 143, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1979).
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2. Legislative Jurisdiction. The state definition of navigability has
also been used to determine the scope of the legislative jurisdiction of a
state to regulate public activity in state waters. Early in our country's
history, many states regulated the construction of dams on rivers and
streams for mills and irrigation. 161 Today, state regulation is broader
and extends to the construction of hydroelectric power plants1 62 and
other structures, 163 and to recreational uses. 164 The use of navigability
to delineate waters subject to state regulation is not, however, always
consistent from state to state, or even within a given state. In some
cases, statutes providing for regulation are limited to "navigable wa-
ters," while in others they are not. In Connecticut, for example, the
Commissioner of Environmental Protection is authorized to regulate
"[a]ny structure, fill, obstruction or encroachment placed in the tidal,
coastal or navigable waters of the state...,-165 whereas, he is author-
ized to regulate "[a]ll dams, dikes, reservoirs and other similar struc-
tures... which, by breaking away or otherwise, might endanger life or
property. .. 166 with no mention of a limitation to navigable waters.
Today, the power of the state, under the general police power, to
regulate the uses of water and submerged lands is generally recognized
to reach beyond "public" waters as traditionally defined. 167 Indeed, as
one Wisconsin Conservation Commission official remarked, "If a
perch can swim in it - even on his side like a flounder - it's naviga-
ble, and we'll take charge."' 168 As a reflection of the breadth of state
161. See TRELEASE, WATER LAW 407 (2d ed. 1974) (discussing the mill dam stat-
utes of New England). Note in this regard an opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court from the early 19th century:
[T]he right to build a dam for the use of a mill was under several implied
limitations. One was to protect private rights, by compelling him to make
compensation to the owners of land above, for, and damages occasioned by,
overflowing of their lands: another was to protect the rights of the public to
the fishery .... Therefore every owner of a water-mill or dam holds it on
the condition, or perhaps under the limitation, that a sufficient and reason-
able passage-way shall be allowed for the fish.
Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 521, 528 (1808). But cf Diana Shooting Club v. Husting,
156 Wis. 261, 270, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (1914) ("The extent of the right of a state to
regulate and control navigable waters and the soil beneath them, and to declare what
waters are navigable, has not been clearly defined.").
162. See, e.g., Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514
(1952).
163. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-76 (West Supp. 1987).
164. See, e.g., CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE § 660 (West 1978) (time of day use re-
strictions, speed zones, special use areas, sanitation, and pollution control measures);
see also Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d 70, 186 N.W.2d 290 (1971)
(ordinance prohibiting use of motor boats on Sundays in summer upheld).
165. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-362 (West 1985).
166. Id. § 22a-401.
167. See TRELEASE, supra note 161, at 407.
168. Id.
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police power, some states have simply expanded their definition of
navigability to include virtually all waters of the state and thus allow
for extensive regulatory control. 169
3. Public Usufructuary Rights. In most states the navigability of
a waterway gives the public certain rights to traditional uses of the
water.170 A Kentucky court opinion provides an example of this inter-
relation: "In and on a navigable stream, the title of riparian owners up
to the ordinary high-water mark, and particularly of the bed and is-
lands therein, is a qualified one, for it is subject to the dominant rights
of the public in the stream."' 171 This language is strikingly similar to
that describing the federal navigational servitude in Scranton v.
Wheeler. 172
Historically, courts limited these rights to commercial uses such
as fishing and navigation, which followed the pattern set at the federal
level. 173 The finding that a public usufructuary right exists is not,
however, necessarily constrained by the same definition of navigability
as that used to determine title to submerged lands. 174 For example, in
1849, the Maine Supreme Court upheld the public's right to use a
freshwater river for driving logs, notwithstanding that under Maine
law, riparian owners on each side owned to the thread (center) of the
stream. 175
As public uses of water bodies expanded, judicial protection of
public usufructuary rights broadened along with them. Beginning
with cases from the late 1800's, 176 state courts increasingly included
169. For example, note Wisconsin's statutory declaration of waters deemed to be
navigable:
(1) Lakes - All lakes wholly or partly within this state which are naviga-
ble in fact are declared to be navigable and public waters, and all persons
have the same rights therein and thereto as they have in and to any other
navigable or public waters.
(2) Streams -... [A]II streams, sloughs, bayous and marsh outlets, which
are navigable in factfor anypurpose whatsoever, are declared navigable to the
extent that no dam, bridge or other obstruction shall be made in or over the
same without the permission of the state.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 30.10 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
170. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 99, at 34.
171. Natcher v. City of Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 586, 95 S.W.2d 255, 257
(1936).
172. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900) ("whether the title to the sub-
merged lands of navigable waters is in the State or in the riparian owners, it was
acquired subject to the rights which the public have in the navigation of such
waters").
173. CLARK, supra note 127, § 37.4(B).
174. Id. § 37.4(B) n.69.
175. Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849).
176. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 99, at 36.
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recreational activities among the public usufructuary rights that super-
seded the property rights of riparian owners. In Attorney General v.
Revere Copper Co., 177 for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that the owner of both sides of a "Great Pond"
could not preclude most uses by the public, including fishing, bathing,
boating, and cutting ice. Public recreational uses of navigable waters
have been upheld in many other states. 178
In some states the right to recreational use is extended to waters,
the beds of which are under private ownership. 179 A provision in the
Wyoming Constitution declares that waters within the boundaries of
the state are the property of the state.'80 This provision has been in-
terpreted by that state's courts as creating a public right of navigation
in all waters, irrespective of the traditional navigability of the water
body as a matter of law or the ownership of the bed.18'
4. State Public Trust Doctrine. To say that the public has certain
usufructuary rights in the navigable waters of a state implies a duty in
the sovereign to protect those rights. State courts that enjoin activities
177. 152 Mass. 444, 25 N.E. 605 (1890).
178. See Southern Idaho Fish and Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock Co., 96 Idaho
360, 362, 528 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1974) (boating, swimming, hunting, and all recrea-
tional purposes); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 200, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893)
(sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, and other purposes that cannot be
enumerated or anticipated); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 316, 462 P.2d
232, 239 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970) (fishing, boating, swimming, water
skiing, and other related recreational purposes); see also Kern River Public Access
Comm. v. City of Bakersfield, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 217 Cal Rptr. 125 (1985);
Droste v. Kerner, 34 Ill. 2d 495, 217 N.E.2d 73 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 456
(1967); Bott v. Commission of Natural Resources, 415 Mich. 45, 327 N.W.2d 838
(1982); Treuting v. Bridge and Park Comm'n of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967);
Gait v. State Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, - Mont. -, 731 P.2d 912 (1987);
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied,
469 U.S. 821 (1984); Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio App. 2d 5, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (1979);
Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition v. State Fish and Wildlife Comm'n, 62 Or.
App. 481, 662 P.2d 356 (1983); State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 338 N.W.2d 492
(1983).
179. See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914)
(right to hunt). This case was based upon a previous ruling in Willow River Club v.
Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898) (upholding the right to fish in "navigable
waters," where the definition of navigable was expanded to include waters capable of
floating logs at certain seasons of the year, and carrying rowboats, although the stream
was not meandered and was so shallow that in some places boats had to be pushed
over the bottom).
180. Wvo. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
181. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). Contra Hartman v. Tresise, 36
Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905),followed in People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 141, 597
P.2d 1025, 1027 (1979) ("[W]e do not feel constrained to follow the trend away from
the coupling of bed title with the right of public recreational use of surface
waters. .. ").
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in derogation of these public rights often characterize their ruling as
upholding a "public trust" in navigable waters and the submerged
lands beneath them. 182 Historically, the trust protected the public
rights of navigation and fishery, although several states expanded it
considerably to include other public uses. 183 Notwithstanding the re-
cent controversy in the literature regarding the existence and content
of the Public Trust Doctrine, 84 early state court decisions often re-
ferred to it quite forthrightly. For example, in Cook v. Dabney, 185 af-
ter review of a claim that occupation of the submerged lands would
interfere with access to navigable waters, the Oregon Supreme Court
voided certain deeds from the state to alluvial deposits in the Willam-
ette River. The court held that title to the lands under navigable wa-
ters vested in the state subject to the public's rights of navigation and
fishing.
To all intents and purposes the title of the state was burdened with a
trust, so to speak, in favor of those two occupations. It would have
no right or authority so to dispose of the subjacent lands in a man-
ner calculated to prejudice or impede the exercise of those rights. It
was never intended by any of the legislation concerning the aliena-
tion of state lands that the state should sell the beds of the navigable
streams in a way to interfere with their navigability.186
Some states have extended the Public Trust Doctrine in favor of
navigation, commerce, fishing, and bathing to apply both to beaches 8 7
and, more recently, to wetlands, in favor of conservation. 188 New
182. See 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.32 (rev. 3d ed. 1978)
("the state does not own the public navigable waters and the submerged bed beneath
them in its proprietary capacity, but holds them as sovereign in trust for the people").
183. See infra notes 187-89 (public trust cases).
184. See, e.g., The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law and Manage-
ment: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAvis. L. REV. 181 (1980).
185. 70 Or. 529, 139 P. 721 (1914), appeal dismissed, 242 U.S. 660 (1916) (naviga-
ble waters are public waters and thus should inure to the benefit of the public).
186. Id. at 532, 139 P. at 722 (emphasis added).
187. See, e.g., Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App.
3d 240, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1111 (1986); City of Daytona
Beach Shores v. State, 483 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1985); Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 55
Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); Idaho Forest Indust.,
Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 733 P.2d 733
(1987); Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986); Matthews v. Bay Head Im-
provement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984);
Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); W. H. Pugh Coal Co. v. State, 105 Wis. 2d 123, 312 N.W.2d
856 (1981).
188. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790, 796 (1971); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); see
also Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
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Jersey has recently held that the Public Trust Doctrine applies to ac-
cess rights on certain privately owned beaches.1 89
Often state courts do not clearly specify the precise basis of the
power of the state to regulate the uses of public waters and their sub-
merged lands. It may be articulated as a function of state ownership
of the submerged lands, as the jurisdiction of the state legislature, or as
a public usufructuary right which the state has a duty to protect as a
public trust. 190 Nevertheless, whatever the articulated basis, it is clear
that at the state, as well as the federal level, navigable waters are con-
sidered "public" in a way non-navigable waters are not. 191
B. The Evolution of State Definitions of Navigability
As public uses of water bodies changed, state definitions of navi-
gability typically changed to accommodate them. To protect the ex-
panded public usufructuary interests, state courts came to consider
"navigable" as a matter of law those waters that supported the new
public uses. As a consequence, many state definitions are now far
more inclusive than the federal navigable-in-fact formulation of The
Daniel Ball.
Like the federal courts, most state courts adopted the English
common law in the period following the formation of the Union, in-
cluding the ebb and flow test for navigability. 192 Pennsylvania was one
of the first to replace the English test, long before the federal courts
189. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984) (holding that a "quasi-public" beach owners association
could not deny access to the general public). See Fellig, Pursuit of the Public Trust:
Beach Access in New Jersey from Neptune v. Avon to Matthews v. BHIA, 10 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 35 (1985); Negris, Access to New Jersey Beaches: The Public Trust Doc-
trine, 20 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 437 (1986).
190. For an excellent compilation and analysis of the approaches of the various
states to the question of the protection of public usufructuary rights, see generally H.
ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS (1978) (prepared for the Portland, Or., Regional
Solicitor, U.S. Dept. of the Interior). In reference to the various state court rulings
upholding the public use of waters, Johnson and Austin note that "[t]here are proba-
bly few areas of law in which similar problems have arisen in the several states where
courts have split so widely, or based their decisions on such diverse theories." John-
son & Austin, supra note 99, at 34.
191. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 435, 658
P.2d 709, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); United
Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 461-63 (N.D. 1970). See also Johnson & Austin, supra note 99, at 34; Stevens,
The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmen-
tal Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 195 (1980).
192. Stevens, supra note 191, at 201. In fact, English courts probably included
several non-tidal rivers as navigable. Id.
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did. 193 Some states developed a more expansive definition of naviga-
bility based upon commercial uses of waterways. For example, a
number of states with important timber industries developed a "saw
log" test under which waterways that could float saw logs were con-
sidered navigable, thus upholding a public right to transport logs in
navigable waterways. 194
Lamprey v. Metcalf is generally recognized to be the first case to
include the recreational use of waterways in a state definition of navi-
gability. 195 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the federal test,
with its focus on "trade and travel on water," did not sufficiently pro-
tect new public recreational uses of that state's waters. 196 Accord-
ingly, it simply expanded the state's definition to include recreational
use. The specific language of the court is worthy of note:
Certainly, we do not see why boating or sailing for pleasure should
not be considered navigation, as well as boating for mere pecuniary
profit.
Many, if not the most, of the meandered lakes in this state, are
not adapted to, and probably will never be used to any great extent
for, commercial navigation; but they are used - and as the popula-
tion increases, and towns and cities are built up in their vicinity, will
be still more used - by the people for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowl-
ing, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and
even city purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which
cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated. To hand over all
these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test of
navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for all time,
the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated. 197
As in Minnesota, the definition of navigability adopted by a state
in many instances determines the usufructuary rights to be protected.
For example, Idaho combines the commercial and recreational tests
into one rule: "[a]ny stream which, in its natural state, will float logs
193. Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 474 (Pa. 1810) (riparian owner of land on the Sus-
quehanna River had no exclusive right of fishery in navigable waters opposite his
land).
194. E.g., Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926); Guilliams v.
Beaver Lake Club, 90 Or. 13, 175 P. 437 (1918); see also CLARK, supra note 127,§ 42.2B and cases listed at n.34.
195. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
196. Id. at 199, 53 N.W. at 1143 (referring to The Daniel Ball test); see supra text
accompanying notes 52-54.
197. 52 Minn. at 199-200, 53 N.W. at 1143; see also Guilliams v. Beaver Lake
Club, 90 Or. at 27, 175 P. at 441 ("The vessel carrying a load of passengers to a picnic




or any other commercial or floatable commodity, or is capable of be-
ing navigated by oar or motor propelled small craft, for pleasure or
commercial purposes, is navigable. ' 198
The definitions of navigability adopted by the various states are
not always consistent from one legal context to the next. The defini-
tion applied in title cases may differ from that used to delimit the area
of protected public usufructuary rights, so that waters may be naviga-
ble for public usufructuary purposes even though the beds are pri-
vately owned. For example, in Wisconsin, the state supreme court
protected the public's right to hunt ducks on a shallow river. The
Wisconsin court held that, although the bed was privately owned, the
river was navigable nonetheless because it was used by the public. 199
Whatever definition of navigability a state may adopt, the funda-
mental principle underlying the state court decisions is that navigabil-
ity reflects the public nature of the water. That public nature, as a
legal concept, in turn implies sovereign authority to control use by the
public, the existence of public usufructuary rights, and the existence of
a duty to protect those rights.20 0
C. Protection of Submerged Lands: Ownership, Regulatory
Control, and Public Rights
A review of the evolution of the term navigability within the vari-
ous states, as well as in the federal courts, demonstrates that the ques-
tion of ownership of submerged lands has become less important as
the basis for both public usufructuary rights and sovereign regulatory
power. Prior to 1926, states typically "lumped together" the issues of
title to submerged lands and the right to public use.20 1 Early state
courts were likely to find that where the submerged lands were state-
owned - that is, where the waters above were navigable for title pur-
poses - the public had a right to use the waters and the submerged
lands for certain purposes.
198. Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360,
362, 528 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1974).
199. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271-72, 145 N.W. 816, 820
(1914) (Rock River held navigable: used for rowboats, depth varied seasonally from
eight inches to two feet, and occasionally dry); see also Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal.
App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951) (owner of the bed beneath a water body made
navigable by a break in a levee could reclaim flooded land but, until such time, could
not prevent the public from fishing or boating).
200. See, e.g., Welder v. State, 196 S.W. 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (examination of
navigability for title purposes). "Behind all definitions of navigable waters lies the
idea of public utility. Waters, which in their natural state are useful to the public for a
considerable portion of the year are navigable." Id. at 873. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 154-55 (discussing state navigability analysis in the 19th century).
201. Johnson & Austin, supra note 99, at 36.
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Conversely, if the beds were privately owned, the public had no
such rights.20 2 The Minnesota decision of Lamprey v. Metcalf 20 3 illus-
trates this conflation of the two issues of title and public usufructuary
rights. The court perceived its task as finding a basis for protecting the
public's ability to use the lake for recreational purposes. 20 4 Previous
Minnesota decisions had indicated that public rights only followed
state ownership, which in turn followed navigability. 20 5 These previ-
ous decisions, however, only considered public commercial activities
and did not protect lakes used exclusively for recreational purposes.20 6
The Minnesota court solved its dilemma by altering the definition
of navigability to include public pleasure boating. South Dakota20 7
and North Dakota20 8 followed a similar pattern by adopting a "plea-
sure boat" test.20 9 In some cases, courts candidly reveal that they
have manipulated the definition of navigability so as to include other
public purposes that they seek to protect. 210
These early cases reflect the misconception that a state must own
the submerged land in order to regulate public activity on the water
body above it. The view that ownership is required to protect the pub-
lic interest collapses two aspects of state sovereignty: proprietary and
legislative, or dominium and imperium to use the Roman concepts.211
In several recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has turned
202. Id.
203. 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
204. The importance of the question, both to the public and to riparian own-
ers, is apparent, when we consider that there are many thousands of such
lakes in this state, which, although most of them may not be adapted for
navigation, in its ordinary, commercial sense, have been, from the earliest
settlement of the state, resorted to and used by the people as places of public
resort, for purposes of boating, fishing, fowling, cutting ice, etc., and the
further fact that observation teaches that the waters of many of these lakes
are, from natural causes, slowly but imperceptibly receding, so that a part of
what was their bed, when surveyed, has, or in time will, become dry land.
The right of the public to use these lakes for the purposes referred to, as well
as the right of riparian owners to these relicted lands, and ... their right of
access to the water ... [is] the question [here].
Id. at 191, 53 N.W. at 1140.
205. Id. at 198, 53 N.W. at 1143.
206. Id.
207. Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937).
208. Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
209. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 99, at 37.
210. See, e.g., Hillebrand, 65 S.D. at 417, 274 N.W. at 822 ("In the early history of
the common law the rights of the public in navigable waters were confined to naviga-
tion. But the term 'navigable' has been extended and includes waters that are not
navigable in the ordinary sense .... [W]hether or not waters are navigable depends
upon the natural availability of waters for public purposes taking into consideration
the natural character and surroundings of a lake or stream.").
211. See supra text accompanying notes 129-34.
[Vol. 5:69
SUBMERGED LANDS
away from state ownership as the basis for a state's power to regulate
its natural resources. In Hughes v. Oklahoma,212 which involved state
control of interstate commerce in wildlife, the Court reversed its previ-
ous holding in Geer v. Connecticut21 3 that a state's power to regulate
in the area of natural resources was based on state ownership. In the
recent case of Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,214 the Court
struck down a ban by the State of Nebraska on the export of ground-
water as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Citing
Hughes v. Oklahoma and other wildlife cases, the Court once again
rejected the state ownership theory. The Court wrote that, "[t]he pub-
lic ownership theory [is] 'but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of
the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource.' "1215
In the area of public usufructuary rights to water, most state
courts today also recognize that the public interest in waters and sub-
merged lands is not limited to those areas that are state owned.216
Since, however, navigability is still considered the legal divider be-
tween "public" and "private" waters, state courts have redefined the
term to encompass this expanding definition of the public interest in
aqueous areas.217 In addition, following the modem trend in both
state and federal courts away from a requirement of state ownership as
basis for state protection of natural resources, courts today typically
engage in a less constrained, more open balancing of the public and
private interests involved. 218 Both these trends, more expansive state
definitions of navigability and a de-emphasis on title as the legal basis
upon which a state may protect submerged lands, indicate that those
engaged in contests over title to these areas may misconstrue the un-
derlying and more significant question of who is to control the uses to
which these areas may be put.
212. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
213. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
214. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
215. Id. at 951 (citations omitted).
216. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 99, at 37-44 for a survey of western states
that uphold public usufructuary rights in waters where the beds are privately owned.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 202-10.
218. See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 174 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.
Alaska 1959) ("The state regulates and controls wildlife resources and fisheries....
This was originally based on the concept of ownership.... This theory has to some
extent been repudiated and the modern concept contemplates that state control is
founded upon the power to regulate in the state the protection of these resources for
all the people."). See infra text accompanying notes 226-27 (discussing de-emphasis
on title as a basis for regulation).
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VII. CONTROL OF THE USE OF ALASKA'S SUBMERGED LANDS
A. Alaska's Expansive Definition of Navigability
As has been seen, a state is free to adopt its own definition of
navigability to provide a legal basis for regulatory jurisdiction, 219 sub-
ject, of course, to federal regulation and supremacy. In addition, a
finding of navigability typically results in the creation of certain usu-
fructuary rights in the public under state common law.220 These
rights might well be recognized by the Alaska state courts, which
would provide another avenue for protection of Alaska's waters and
submerged lands.
Regarding control of use and access to public waters, the State of
Alaska has, by constitutional and statutory provisions, established its
own definition of navigable waters. This definition is far more inclu-
sive than the federal definition set forth in The Daniel Ball. Specifi-
cally, section 38.05.965(12) of the Alaska Statutes defines navigable
waters in the following way:
any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough,
creek, bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean,
or any other body of water or waterway within the territorial limits
of the state or subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for
any useful public purpose, including ...commercial navigation,
floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating,
trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other
public recreational purposes. 22 1
Article VIII, section 14, of the Alaska Constitution provides for a pub-
lic right of access to all "navigable" or "public" waters of the state:
Free access to the navigable or public waters of the State, as defined
by the legislature, shall not be denied any citizen of the United
States or resident of the State, except that the legislature may by
general law regulate and limit such access for other beneficial uses
or public purposes.222
In addition, Article VIII, section 3, of the Alaska Constitution pro-
vides for the common use of all natural resources: "Wherever occur-
ring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the
people for their common use."' 223 Finally, section 46.15.030 of the
219. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 262 (1913) ("[W]hat shall be deemed
a navigable water within the meaning of the local rules of property is for the determi-
nation of the several States.").
220. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. In his announcement of the
change in chargeability policy, Secretary Watt noted that "State ownership, of course,
ensures public control and public access." United States Dep't of the Interior, Office
of the Sec'y, Press Release (Aug. 22, 1983) [hereinafter Announcement of Sec'y Watt].
221. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.965(12) (1984).
222. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 14 (emphasis added).
223. Id. § 3.
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Alaska Statutes reserves all the waters of the state for the common use
of the public: "Wherever occurring in a natural state, the water is
reserved to the people for common use and is subject to appropriation
and beneficial use and to reservation of instream flows and levels of
water .... *"224
Based upon these constitutional and statutory provisions, the
State of Alaska has the power to ensure access to and regulate the use
of its waters, independent of both the federal definition of navigability
and ownership of the submerged lands. This regulatory jurisdiction
for the public benefit attaches even where the submerged lands are
privately owned or are owned by the federal government, 225 unless a
federal statute controls their use.
B. The De-Emphasis on Title as the Basis for Protection of the
Public Interest in Alaska's Submerged Lands
As the policy issues surrounding public and private waters have
been more clearly articulated, the traditional grounding of public and
private rights solely in proprietary ownership has become less critical.
In the language of certain recent state court decisions, the underlying
public interest in the water is the pivotal issue, rather than traditional
questions of navigability or title. For example, in People v. Mack,226 a
case involving public recreational rights to waters over privately held
land, a California appellate court stated that "it is extremely impor-
tant that the public not be denied use of recreational water by applying
the narrow and outmoded interpretation of 'navigability.' "227
Even courts that retain an emphasis on the historical connection
between title and navigability have expanded the definition of naviga-
bility to provide greater protection of public rights and hold that title
to submerged lands beneath navigable waters is held subject to those
public rights. In a case from 1936, the Oregon Supreme Court ex-
pressed this more flexible approach to the nature of public usufructu-
ary rights in certain waters, independent of title and navigability in the
traditional sense:
While we have held that Blue Lake is not a navigable body of water
in the sense that title to the bed thereof would pass to the state upon
admission to the Union, it is navigable in a qualified or limited
sense. ....
224. ALASKA STAT. § 46.16.030 (1982).
225. Alaska Public Easement Defense Fund v. Andrus, 435 F. Supp. 664, 677 (D.
Alaska 1977) ("the State owns or controls the land beneath navigable waters, and the
people of the State have the right to use the water itself on non-navigable rivers and
streams").
226. 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971); see also Bohn v. Albertson,
107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951). See supra note 199.
227. People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
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There are hundreds of similar beautiful, small inland lakes in
this state well adapted for recreational purposes, but which will
never be used as highways of commerce in the ordinary acception of
such terms .... Regardless of the ownership of the bed, the public
has the paramount right to the use of the waters of the lake for the
purposes of transportation and commerce.2 28
These recent developments show that many state courts have re-
assessed the historical reliance upon title as the basis for state regula-
tory control over waters and the submerged lands. 229 Concommi-
tantly, courts are also reconsidering the grounding of public
usufructuary rights in the navigability of the water.23 0
Whether the state courts in Alaska will follow this trend away
from a focus on navigability to determine the appropriate use of water
bodies and their submerged lands is, of course, conjectural. But even
if Alaska courts were to adhere to the traditional concept of navigabil-
ity as determinative of state regulatory jurisdiction and public usufruc-
tuary rights, Alaska has established a very broad definition of
navigability in its constitution, which would include most of the wa-
ters of the state that might be used by the public. Alaska's expansive
definition of navigability may provide a basis for state regulation of the
valuable natural resources beneath the state's waters without risking a
"taking." In this situation, Alaska courts might hold that private
owners acquired the submerged lands subject to the usufructuary
rights of the public.
This analysis of state definitions of navigability reveals two princi-
ples: one, a state may define the term navigability differently than the
federal courts; and, two, a determination of navigability extends gov-
ernmental authority over, as well as public usufructuary rights in, the
228. Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625, 634-36, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1936) (empha-
sis added).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 201-18. The reassessment of regulatory
jurisdiction is reflected at the federal level as well. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (Corps of Engineers' regulations could
extend Corps' regulatory authority over wetlands adjacent to navigable waters);
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982) (groundwater in a
state is an article of commerce and subject to congressional regulation); Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) ("Congress has extensive authority over this
Nation's waters under the Commerce Clause."); see also Alaska v. United States, 563
F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 968 (1985) ("A finding of navigability is no longer even necessary in order for
Congress to be able to regulate commerce on a waterbody.") (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444
U.S. at 173-74).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 201-18. Colorado is a notable exception in
its refusal to follow other states in upholding public boating rights over privately held




submerged lands independent of their ownership. These two princi-
ples place any contest over title to Alaska's submerged lands in a dif-
ferent light. If the motivation of the State of Alaska is simply to own
more real estate, for whatever reason, then indeed the contests over
navigability are appropriate to determine ownership of the submerged
lands according to the Equal Footing Doctrine. If, however, the pri-
mary motivation of the state is to protect Alaska's lake and stream
beds from undesirable economic exploitation and degradation, other
avenues of land use control are available to protect Alaska waters.
In Alaska, as elsewhere, legitimate private ownership, with its at-
tendant rights to enjoyment and exploitation, must exist side by side
with public usufructuary rights in valuable natural resources. Rather
than engaging in zero-sum contests for ownership, at least in the case
of Alaska's submerged lands, perhaps a better balance of those inter-
ests can be achieved by applying Alaska's expansive definition of "nav-
igable waters."
VIII. CHARGEABILITY
A. The Disposition of Lands Beneath Non-Navigable
Water Bodies
Prior to the recent change in policy by the Department of the
Interior, lands beneath non-navigable water bodies in Alaska were
treated as fastlands. They were included as part of the grant from the
United States, and their acreage was deducted from the selector's re-
maining entitlement.2 31 In 1983, under then Secretary James Watt,
the Department of the Interior changed that policy so that much of
the land beneath non-navigable bodies of water is no longer charged
against the selector's entitlement. 232
1. The New Interior Policy. Under the new Department of the
Interior policy, Alaska water bodies are treated according to the
guidelines set forth in the Manual of Survey Instructions.2 33 Essen-
tially unchanged since the mid-nineteenth century, the Manual is is-
sued by the BLM as a set of instructions for and guidelines to surveys
conducted by its personnel. The Department did not, however, apply
the Manual to surveys in Alaska until 1983.
231. See 38 Fed. Reg. 14,218 (1973) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 2650.5-1(b) (amended
1983)).
232. 48 Fed. Reg. 54,483 (1983) (amending 43 C.F.R. § 2650.5-1(b)). The "in-
terim waiver of regulations" promulgating the new policy was published on Dec. 5,
1983.
233. Alaska Native Selections, 43 C.F.R. 2650.5-1(2) (1986); MANUAL OF SURVEY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 38, §§ 3-120, 3-121.
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The Manual specifies that lakes in excess of fifty acres and
streams greater than three chains in width are to be "meandered" and
segregated from the area surveyed.234 Meandering is the process of
outlining large water bodies (both navigable and non-navigable) on the
area surveyed so that the wet acreage included within the meander line
can be segregated from the area surveyed for the purpose of calculat-
ing the acreage conveyed. Under the new policy, the meandering cri-
teria in the Manual distinguish those areas that are "wet" and not
charged, from those that are "dry" (or contain water bodies under fifty
acres or three chains in width) which are charged.235
It is also part of the new policy that the grantee of land that con-
tains submerged land beneath meanderable, but non-navigable water
receives title to those lands, notwithstanding their segregation from
the area surveyed and nonchargeability to the grantee. 236 That is, all
the submerged land beneath meanderable water bodies - whether
navigable or not - is to be segregated from the area surveyed, and
following conveyance of the fastlands, the area under those large bod-












1. State takes under the Equal Footing Doctrine Not Charged
2. State takes under new chargeability policy Not Charged
3. State takes as part of the grant Charged
4. State takes under the Equal Footing Doctrine Not Charged
5. Native takes under new chargeability policy Not Charged
6. Native takes as part of grant Charged
234. 43 C.F.R. 2650.5-1 (1986); MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note
38, § 3-115 ("the traverse of the margin of a permanent natural body of water is
termed a meander line"). Segregation has two consequences. First, the acreage is not
counted as fastland for which the grantee will be charged. Second, the land is, in fact,
not included in the grant. Title to the segregated submerged lands then becomes a
matter to be determined under applicable law.
235. MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 38, §§ 3-115, 3-120, 3-121.
236. See H.R. 2629, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 6940-44 (1987)





2. The Riparian Rights Question. Under the new policy (in con-
junction with the operation of the Equal Footing Doctrine), the
United States would never retain an interest in land beneath meander-
able water. It is beyond dispute that the Equal Footing Doctrine de-
termines the disposition of title to land beneath navigable water. As to
the transfer of title to segregated land beneath non-navigable water
from the United States to a federal grantee, there is apparent agree-
ment among the state, the Native community, and the Department of
the Interior that the grantee receives the submerged land by operation
of law. There is, however, disagreement over what law governs the
transfer of title to these submerged lands. Several theories have been
proposed. Many state officials, leaders in the Native community, and
administrators in the Department of the Interior assert that Alaska's
state riparian rights law applies.237 Under that doctrine of state com-
mon law, the grantee of a parcel bordering on a non-navigable body of
water also receives title to a portion of the adjacent submerged
lands. 238 Others believe that federal statutory law applies, with the
same result as under state riparian rights law.239 In apparent acknowl-
edgement that the law is ambiguous on this point, the legislation pend-
ing before Congress to ratify the new policy provides that the United
States simply quitclaim its interest in any submerged land beneath
meanderable, non-navigable bodies of water in Alaska.240
Whatever the legal theory, the effect of the new policy is that the
United States waives all ownership rights in the submerged lands be-
neath meanderable bodies of water in Alaska. Thus, the BLM need
not determine the navigability of these water bodies prior to convey-
ance of the submerged land by the federal government. 241 Rather, this
waiver leaves the state and the Natives to settle between themselves
237. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Riparian Rights in State Selections under the Alaska Statehood Act
(Memorandum from the Attorney General of the State of Alaska to the Commissioner
of the Dep't of Natural Resources (Aug. 6, 1982)) [hereinafter Memorandum from the
Alaska Att'y Gen'l].
239. MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 38, § 7-51 ("The Govern-
ment's conveyance of title to a fractional subdivision fronting upon a nonnavigable
body of water, unless specific reservations are indicated in the patent, carries owner-
ship to the middle of the bed in front of the basic holding."). For an example of
application of federal law in granting riparian title to submerged lands formerly under
title of the United States, see Oklahoma v. Texas, 261 U.S. 345 (1923). See also 43
U.S.C. § 931 (1982) ("in all cases where the opposite banks of any streams not naviga-
ble belong to different persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become common
to both").
240. H.R. 2629, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 6940-44 (1987) (passed by
the House of Representatives on August 3, 1987); S. 1493, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1987) (pending before the Senate).
241. H.R. 2629, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 901(a)(3), 122 CONG. REc. 6940 (1987)
("the Secretary is not required to determine the navigability of a lake, river, or stream
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any remaining questions of navigability as pertains to ownership of
submerged lands. If the state should consider a certain water body to
be navigable, it may assert its claim in any action to challenge the title
of a Native corporation or other federal grantees.
In addition, the new policy would have retroactive effect by re-
quiring recalculation of the acreage of all previous state and Native
conveyances.242 The remaining entitlements must also be recalculated
to reflect the new chargeability policy. Estimates of the resulting in-
creases, combining both state and Native allowances, vary from
783,000 acres, estimated by the Alaska Department of Natural Re-
sources, to 1,895,000, estimated by the Bureau of Land
Management.243
3. Issues Raised by the New Policy. The Department of the Inte-
rior has offered two main explanations for the change in the
chargeability policy. First, use of the Manual of Survey Instructions
in Alaska would bring BLM's treatment of submerged lands in that
state in conformance with the historical practice in the lower forty-
eight states.244 Second, treating all meanderable water bodies simi-
larly would greatly reduce federal involvement in litigation over their
navigability. 245
Many environmentalists, however, oppose the new Interior pol-
icy.246 These groups argue that permitting the grantee to receive acre-
age beneath large, meanderable, but non-navigable bodies of water in
Alaska without a deduction of the acreage from remaining selection
entitlements amounts to a "give-away" of a large area of valuable pub-
lic land.247 Of particular concern to the environmentalists are those
Native villages adjacent to or inside "conservation system units"
("CSUs"), which are parks and refuges established by ANILCA.
which because of its size or width is required to be meandered .. "). It is not speci-
fied in the legislation whether the Secretary must determine the navigability of non-
meanderable bodies of water. While normally this omission would not pose a prob-
lem, under the liberal navigability standard of the Gulkana River decision, Alaska v.
United States, 622 F. Supp. 455 (D. Alaska 1987), some non-meanderable bodies of
water may nonetheless be deemed navigable for title purposes. See supra note 48.
242. Letter to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, supra note 46,
at 5.
243. Memorandum from the State Director, United States Department of the Inte-
rior, to the Director, Alaska Department of Natural Resources, United States Depart-
ment of the Interior (May 1, 1987). See supra note 48.
244. Id. at 6.
245. Id.
246. Both the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club have filed suit against the
Interior Department. The Wilderness Soc'y v. Carruthers, Civ. No. 84-1823 (D.D.C.
filed Jan. 30, 1986). Carruthers is currently on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit on the issue of standing.
247. Id. at 11.
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Under ANCSA, such "underselected" villages may select lands within
CSU's to reach their full entitlement. 248
The change in the Department of Interior's chargeability policy
presents three separate questions regarding the disposition of sub-
merged lands beneath meanderable, non-navigable bodies of water in
Alaska. First, should the Manual of Survey Instructions be applied in
Alaska, so that meanderable bodies of water, whether navigable or
not, are segregated out of the area to be conveyed? Second, if these
submerged lands are segregated out, should title pass nonetheless to
the grantee of the adjacent fastlands? Third, if title does pass, should
the grantee be charged for the acreage? 249
Careful consideration of these three questions requires examina-
tion of a more fundamental issue: whether state or federal law applies
to settle questions of the disposition of submerged lands included in a
federal land grant. More specifically, what is the relationship between
state and federal law regarding the lands transferred from the United
States to a grantee? Is the United States a mere landowner in a given
state, whose property transfers are governed by state law, or is there a
federal interest sufficient to warrant the application of federal law?
Can the operation of state law divest the federal government of its
property?
In a sense, the choice of law question hinges on the way one con-
ceives ownership of these submerged lands. If title to the submerged
area is simply a riparian right incidental to the ownership of adjacent
fastlands, like use of the water itself, then it would seem appropriate
that state law should determine rights incidental to property within
that state.250 By contrast, if title to the submerged lands is seen as a
question of the extent of a grant of federal property to a grantee, then
federal law is more appropriate to determine this issue because it in-
volves significant federal interests. 251
It is the view of this author that the traditional rule which recog-
nizes the applicability of state law - that is, that ownership of the
submerged lands beneath non-navigable bodies of water is a right inci-
dental to the ownership of the adjacent fastlands under state law -
248. ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. § 1621(e) (1982); see also ANILCA, Pub. L. No. 94-487,
§ 1302(a), 94 Stat. 2371, 2474 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3192(a) (1982))
("[T]he Secretary is authorized, consistent with other applicable law in order to carry
out the purposes of this Act, to acquire by purchase, donation, exchange, or otherwise
any lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit .... "). See supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
249. The House Bill and pending Senate Bill answer the first two questions in the
affirmative and the third in the negative. See supra note 7.
250. See Meanderable Waterbody Analysis, Alaska Dep't of Natural Resources,
Division of Land & Water Management (Sept. 20, 1984).
251. See Announcement by Sec'y Watt, supra note 220.
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may be inappropriate in the unique Alaska context. This traditional
rule overlooks the unique legislative context, specifically the Statehood
Act, ANCSA, and ANILCA, in which the federal government has
sought to dispose of its interest in Alaska submerged lands. In con-
trast, earlier dispositions of federal lands in the lower forty-eight states
occurred when the national economy was largely agrarian and sub-
merged lands were considered worthless. Such is not the case in mod-
em-day Alaska.
B. Submerged Lands and Federalism: The Question of Applicable
Law
Whether one supports the new chargeability policy depends, in
part, upon one's view of the applicable law. The State of Alaska and
accordingly many in the Native community take the position that state
law controls on the question of the riparian rights of a federal
grantee.252 Under Alaska common law, the riparian owner of land
bordering a non-navigable body of water also owns part of the adjoin-
ing submerged land, usually to the center line of a stream or in a
wedge to the center of a lake.253 Applying this state law, the federal
grantee obtains title to the submerged lands not by selection and grant
from the federal government, but by virtue of the operation of a state
legal doctrine. Since ownership of the submerged lands is by opera-
tion of law, it follows that the grantee should not be charged for the
acreage.
The acquisition of these "additional" submerged lands by opera-
tion of state law depends upon the validity, indeed the supremacy, of
state riparian rights vis-a-vis the federal government. One might look
instead, however, to the language of the federal grant to determine the
extent of submerged land intended to pass to the grantee. Under set-
tled federal law, sovereign grants are generally to be strictly construed
against the grantee. 254 Even without invoking such a rule of construc-
tion, according to the express language of the grant, the adjacent sub-
merged lands would not pass to the grantee, as these lands would have
been segregated from the area granted as required by the Manual of
Survey Instructions. 255
252. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Alaska Att'y Gen'l, supra note 238.
253. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.040(4) (1983) (codifying the common law midpoint
rule).
254. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 235 (1960) ("all fed-
eral [lands] grants are [to be] construed in favor of the Government lest they be en-
larged to include more than what was expressly included"); see also Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 10 (1894). Grants to Indian tribes are an exception to this general rule.
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 634 (1970).
255. MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 38.
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The position of the Department of the Interior is that federal law
applies to determine the riparian ownership rights of a federal grantee,
but that in this instance, the riparian grantee nonetheless receives title
to the adjacent submerged lands. According to the Department, since
"1796 it has been the law" that a federal grantee takes to the center of
a stream or lake.256 For this proposition, the Department refers to a
1796 federal law that originally related to the disposition of rivers in
the Northwest Territory,2 57 as well as the case of Hardin v. Jordan.2 58
According to the Department, it "has applied these principles consist-
ently to land conveyances in both the lower forty-eight states and
Alaska, except as to selections by the State of Alaska under the Alaska
Statehood Act and to selections by Native Corporations under the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). ' 25 9
Although they come to the same conclusion - that the grantee
receives but is not charged for the submerged lands beneath adjacent
non-navigable water bodies by operation of law - the state and the
Natives on the one hand, and the Department of the Interior on the
other, evidently take quite different views as to the question of applica-
ble law. However, even if it were possible, the mere resolution of the
choice of law question will not settle the issue of chargeability. There
are several additional points regarding the relationship between the
federal government, the state, and the federal grantee on the issue of
title to submerged lands in Alaska beneath non-navigable waters that
one must also consider. Four different viewpoints are suggested here.
First, one may view federal and state law as operating sequentially, so
that even if federal law controls on the question of the transfer of
property from the United States to a federal grantee, state law may be
seen to determine relative rights between property owners in that state
once the transfer has taken place.260 Second, the issue can be seen as
one of construction, to ascertain the intent of the grantor. If that in-
tent is not clear, then courts often look to state law for guidance with
regard both to the extent of the property transfer and to incidental
256. Letter to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, supra note 46,
at 4.
257. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 55, 1 Stat. 464 (1800) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 931 (1982)).
258. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
259. Letter to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, supra note 46,
at 4. It should be noted that since the rule of Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891) is
usually interpreted to mean that state law governs in such instances, it would appear
inconsistent for the Department to cite both Hardin and the Act of May 18, 1796, to
support its position, at least with regard to the choice of law issue. See infra note 267
and accompanying text.




rights associated with the granted property. 261 Third, the Statehood
Act and ANCSA both can be seen as being in the nature of a contract
for the transfer of federal land. Thus, change in the method of calcu-
lating the acreage transferred would be an alteration affecting the con-
tractual terms. Fourth, it is appropriate to look to the legislative
history of the Alaska Statehood Act and ANCSA to determine the
intent of Congress regarding the transfer of federal land adjacent to
non-navigable bodies of water in Alaska. Such an investigation might
clarify the intent of the grantor (the United States) regarding the dis-
position of these lands, obviating the need to look to state law for clari-
fication. These four points will be considered further after a discussion
of the choice of law question.
C. Transfer of Federal Property: Analysis of the Choice of Law
Issue
The more general question of the relative applicability of federal
and state law has always been subject to varying interpretations, par-
ticularly on the issue of federal common law.262 From the days of
Swift v. Tyson, 263 through Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 264 to City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois J,265 and 11,266 the Supreme Court has struggled
with the task of reconciling competing state and federal laws in our
dual-sovereign federalist system of government. With regard to the
issue of the extent of the property transferred from the federal govern-
ment to a grantee where the lands in question are adjacent to a non-
navigable body of water, there are three basic and diverging views on
the issue of the applicable law. Simply put, one view holds that state
law controls, another that federal law controls, and a third, a variation
of the second, that federal law adopts state law in this instance. Each
view has a coherent logic, but the analytic distinctions among them
are not often clearly recognized by the courts that are called upon to
decide this issue. Consequently, court opinions are often both con-
fused and confusing. The next section will attempt to clarify the basic
dispute and offer a recommendation for the preferred position - that
261. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
262. For an admirable clarification of some of the underlying issues, see Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883 (1986).
263. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal courts could announce federal
"general" law if no state statute existed on the subject).
264. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that in diversity cases federal courts should apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law, and that "[t]here is no federal gen-
eral common law"). Id. at 84-85.
265. 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (holding that federal common law applies in cases involv-
ing interstate water pollution).
266. 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that federal common law in interstate water
pollution cases was superseded by the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972).
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federal law (not as defined by the state) should control on the issue of
the extent of real property transferred by a federal grant.
1. The State Law View. Several Supreme Court pronouncements,
most notably Hardin v. Jordan,267 support the view that state riparian
law controls the determination of ownership rights incidental to a fed-
eral grant of property that borders on water. Most of the Supreme
Court cases cited in support of this proposition, however, involved
lands bordering on navigable rather than non-navigable waters.2 68 In
such cases it is sensible to refer to state law, because under the Equal
Footing Doctrine the state owns the submerged lands beneath its navi-
gable waters.269 In contrast, Hardin v. Jordan 270 is more immediately
relevant because it concerned a federal grant of land bordering on a
non-navigable lake.
Hardin was an action in ejectment brought by Mrs. Gertrude
Hardin on the basis of her ownership of fractional lots within the rec-
tangular boundaries of which were submerged lands beneath a non-
navigable lake.271 The federal survey referred to the lake in question
as a "navigable lake," but the Court found that in fact it was not navi-
gable for purposes of ascertaining title. To resolve the question
whether the property of a federal grantee stopped at the edge of the
water or extended to the center of the lake, the Supreme Court looked
to Illinois law. Without citation, the Court provided the following
sparse explanation for its choice of law: "This question must be de-
cided by some rule of law, and no rule of law can be resorted to for the
purpose except the local law of the State of Illinois. ' '2 72
Regarding the matter of the "chargeability" of the submerged
lands and the then current practices of the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, the Hardin Court noted:
It has been the practice of the government from its origin, in dispos-
ing of the public lands, to measure the price to be paid for them by
267. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
268. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891);
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877).
269. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text (discussing the Equal Footing
Doctrine).
270. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
271. Part of her property was in Illinois, part in Indiana. See also Hardin v. Shed,
190 U.S. 508, 518 (1903) (involving the section in Indiana).
272. 140 U.S. at 380. The same question of choice of law as applicable to the
federal grant of riparian lands adjacent to a non-navigable lake was raised in Kean v.
Calumet Canal and Improvement Co., 190 U.S. 452 (1903). The Court adhered to the




the quantity of upland granted, no charge being made for the lands
under the bed of the stream, or other body of water.273
The opinion does not indicate, however, whether historically a ripa-
ran actually received title to the submerged lands for which he was
not charged. In addition, in assessing the precedential value of Hardin
to Alaska, it is worth considering that there may be a significant dis-
tinction between a small grant to a homesteader for farming and the
millions of acres granted to the state and the Alaska Natives.
The view that state law controls on the issue of riparian rights
incident to property transferred by the federal government assumes
that, once title to the fastlands has passed, both the United States and
the grantee are property owners within the boundaries of a given state.
Accordingly, state law would decide the question of riparian rights.
Adopting this view, federal and state law may be seen as operating
sequentially, with federal law controlling on the question of the extent
of the property transferred by the grant, and state law on the issue of
the rights incidental to that transfer once it has taken place. 274 The
Supreme Court articulated this principle as early as 1839 and reaf-
firmed it in the recent case of Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Cor-
vallis Sand and Gravel Co.:
We hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question in
any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land which had once
been the property of the United States has passed, that question
must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that when-
ever, according to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that
property, like all other property in the state, is subject to state legis-
lation; so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission that
the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United
States.275
In the context of title to submerged lands, however, the rights
"incidental" to the transfer of federal property are not usufructuary,
but are by definition ownership rights that effectively result in a trans-
fer of additional property. Thus, the distinction drawn by the
Supreme Court - that title passes under federal law after which state
law controls on questions of subsequent riparian rights - collapses.
The riparian right at issue is not an "incidental" right that attaches
with ownership; it is ownership itself of the adjacent submerged land.
273. 140 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added).
274. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 370-71 (1977).




The view that state law should control on questions of the extent
of property transferred to a federal grantee as riparian owner is unset-
tling for two reasons. First, the application of state riparian law re-
sults in a further transfer of property from the United States to the
federal grantee beyond that expressly contained in the grant. Such a
result implies that state law can divest the federal government of its
property. Second, were state law to control, determinations of the ex-
tent of a federal grant could vary from state to state and over time,
depending upon the various states' laws of riparian rights. The extent
of federal ownership, as well as that of federal grantees, would be
uncertain.
2. The Federal Law View. In contrast to the Hardin view, some
in the Department of the Interior have adopted the position that fed-
eral law controls in cases involving the transfer of federal property to a
federal grantee. 276 There is a strong line of Supreme Court cases sup-
porting this position,277 most notable of which is Borax Consolidated
Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles,278 decided in 1935. Borax involved a ques-
tion of the extent of a federal grant bordering on tidelands near Los
Angeles. The specific language of the Court merits repeating:
The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to the
limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between the upland and
the tideland, is necessarily afederal question. It is a question which
concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States;
it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted
under federal law.279
It is difficult to reconcile the Borax requirement that federal law
applies to questions concerning the validity and effect of an act done
by the United States with the Hardin rule that state law should apply
to federal grants of property bordering on non-navigable bodies of
276. Letter to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, supra note 46,
at 4. See also MANUAL OF SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 38, § 7-51. Although
the Department of the Interior seems to rely on Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371
(1891), as support for an inference that federal law controls on the extent of a federal
land grant, one should note that the Hardin Court was applying state rather than
federal law.
277. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931) ("State laws cannot affect
titles vested in the United States."); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55
(1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922); Packer
v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891).
278. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
279. Id. at 22 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27
(1935) ("The laws of the United States alone control the disposition of title to its
lands."). A more recent case involving accretions to tidelands owned by a federal
grantee whose predecessor in interest took before statehood, held that federal, not
state, law controlled. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (holding that Borax
was dispositive of the issue).
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water. Nevertheless, the essential question Borax raises is: what is
federal riparian rights law? Two very different theories have been ad-
vanced. One looks to federal statutory law, the other to state common
law.
a. Federal statutory law. On May 18, 1796, Congress enacted
legislation regarding the disposition of the United States territorial
lands northwest of the Ohio River, known as the Northwest Terri-
tory.2 80 On the issue of the disposition of river beds, the current ver-
sion of the statute, as amended to include other federal lands, reads:
"All navigable rivers, within the territory occupied by the public
lands, shall remain and be deemed public highways; and, in all cases
where the opposite banks of any streams not navigable belong to differ-
ent persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become common to
both.' ' 281 Research reveals few judicial references to this statutory
provision after 1900, possibly because federal courts adopted Hardin's
pronouncement that state common law controls. In 1869, the
Supreme Court did discuss the statute extensively in Railroad Co. v.
Schurmeir,28 2 which involved a dispute over shoreland at St. Paul on
the Mississippi River. The rationale of the Court's opinion is worthy
of note, especially in contrast to that in Hardin v. Jordan.283
The case involved a dispute over an area which at low water was
connected to the shore, at medium water was separated by a channel,
and at high water was completely flooded. A federal survey drew a
meander line some distance from what was considered the bank of the
river, and the area in dispute lay between the meander line and the
bank of the Mississippi. Without any consideration of the possibility
that state law should apply, the Court looked to the Act of 1796 and
announced the rule that:
Proprietors, bordering on streams not navigable, unless restricted
by the terms of their grant, hold to the centre of the stream; but...
proprietors of lands bordering on navigable rivers, under titles de-
rived from the United States, hold only to the stream, as the express
provision is, that all such rivers shall be deemed to be, and remain
public highways. 284
As a basis for its ruling, the Schurmeir Court looked to the writ-
ings of Chancellor Kent,28 5 concerning the classic distinction between
280. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 55, 1 Stat. 464 (1800) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 931 (1982)).
281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1868).
283. 140 U.S. 371 (1891). It is uncertain why the Hardin Court did not mention
the Act of May 18, 1796, in the opinion. See supra note 280.
284. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 287.
285. 3 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 53648 (1 1th ed. 1867).
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navigable waters and non-navigable waters as public and private wa-
ters respectively.286 According to Kent, if the body of water in ques-
tion were navigable, it would remain open to public use, with the
boundary of the federal grantee's property being the river bank.287
The Court indicated that in making the distinction between navigable
and non-navigable streams, Congress "intended to provide that the
common law rules of riparian ownership should apply to lands border-
ing on the latter, but that the title to lands bordering on navigable
streams should stop at the stream .... 288 After finding the Missis-
sippi to be a navigable stream for purposes of applying the Act of
1796, the Court held that the property of the federal grantee extended
to the edge of the water, including the area in dispute.
The logic (and dicta) of the Schurmeir Court regarding the
boundary of a federal grant bordering on a non-navigable water body
was cited as authority in the case of Indiana v. Milk.289 In construing
the Swamp and Overflowed Land Grant Act of 1850,290 the circuit
court held that, although the federal survey did not include the bed of
a large, non-navigable lake, the state, nonetheless, acquired title to the
bed by virtue of its ownership of the riparian land. Rather than turn-
ing to state law, as did the Hardin Court, the Milk court looked to the
Act of 1796 for guidance, and to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Act in Schurmeir:291 "In Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, . . . this sec-
tion was interpreted to mean that instead of the owners of opposite
banks of a non-navigable stream being tenants in common of the bed,
each held in severalty to the center of the stream. '292
More importantly, the court considered the federal policy behind
the Act of 1796 with regard to the question of the public interest, or
lack thereof, in non-navigable waterways. The court noted that, "[n]o
right was reserved by the Act of 1796 to the beds of non-navigable
streams, because the public had no interest in such streams, and it was
not the policy of the government to be a land-owner in the states."293
286. See supra text accompanying notes 182-91 (discussing this aspect of
navigability).
287. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 287 ("[T]he public, in cases where the river is navigable
for boats and rafts, have an easement therein, or a right of passage, subject to thejus
publicum, as a public highway.").
288. 74 U.S. at 289.
289. 11 F. 389 (C.C.D. Ind. 1882).
290. Ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (1850) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 981-84
(1982)).
291. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1868).
292. 11 F. at 393. An estate in severalty is one "held by a person in his own right
only, without any other person being joined or connected with him.... ." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 493 (5th ed. 1979).
293. Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
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The circuit court examined congressional policy behind passage
of the Swamp Lands Act, and determined that, as with the Act of
1796, the federal government had no interest in retaining the beds of
non-navigable waters:
There were at this time, in many of the states, swamp and over-
flowed public lands which were of no value to the government for any
purpose, present or prospective, unless drained. It had never been
the policy of the government to reclaim such lands with a view to
their sale. They were unfit for cultivation and useless for
habitation. 294
The approach of the Milk court is instructive. It looked to fed-
eral law to ascertain the federal interest in the lands at issue. Finding
none, and finding no express reservation of the land in the grant, the
court awarded title to the state.
b. The federal law adopts state law view. In addition to the state
and federal law views, a third view, a corollary to the federal law view,
is that a court should look to state law to ascertain the rights incident
to lands transferred by federal grant, absent an expression of intent by
the grantor. According to this view, state law is consulted not because
it applies as between federal and state law, but rather because, when
federal law is otherwise silent, it incorporates state law on the issue of
property rights incident to the transferred land. The Supreme Court
articulated this view in United States v. Oregon, 295 in which the Court
interpreted the holding of Hardin v. Jordan296 to support its holding.
Pursuant to a state statute that vested title to all submerged lands
within the boundaries of the state, the State of Oregon, in United
States v. Oregon, had asserted its title claim to the submerged lands
beneath non-navigable bodies of water adjacent to lands granted by
the United States to a private grantee. The Supreme Court held that,
in this instance, state law did not apply to divest the grantee of title to
his submerged lands. The Court wrote that:
It is insisted that after statehood local law controls the disposition
of the title to lands retained by the United States underlying non-
navigable waters within the state, and that the effect, upon the title
to such lands, of the conveyances of the adjacent upland by the
United States is to be determined by reference to state laws. In sup-
port of this proposition, reliance is placed upon language in the
opinion in Hardin v. Jordan ... which, however, refers in part to
conveyances of uplands bounded on navigable waters (tide water,)
and upon the decisions of certain state courts applying the rule con-
tended for to lands underlying nonnavigable waters ....
294. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
295. 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
296. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
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It is true ... that the disposition of such lands is a matter of the
intention of the grantor, the United States, and "if its intention be
not otherwise shown ... its conveyance ... [is] given effect in this
particular according to the law of the state in which the land lies."
This was the effect of the decisions in Hardin v. Jordan ... Mitchell
v. Smale ... and Kean v. Calumet Canal & Imp. Co. ... in which
conveyances bounded upon the waters of a nonnavigable lake were,
when construed in accordance with local law, held impliedly to con-
vey to the middle of the lake.297
To apply the rule in United States v. Oregon to the situation in
Alaska, the courts would look first to the intent of the grantor (the
United States) as expressed in the granting statutes (the Statehood Act
and ANCSA) and their respective legislative histories. If that federal
intent were not clear, Alaska riparian law would apply as federal law
to define the rights to the submerged lands incident to land transferred
by federal grant.
The view that federal law applies, and that, absent any indications
of intent of the grantor, federal law borrows state law to construe ripa-
rian rights in a property grant from the federal government, is concep-
tually distinct from the view that, ab initio, state law applies. The
result may be the same - the application of state law - but the con-
ceptualization of the essential relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the laws of the individual states is quite different. Hardin v.
Jordan 298 is sometimes used in a somewhat cavalier fashion to support
both views, but the proposition that state law can divest the federal
government of its property seems untenable. In a statement notable
for its clarity on the point of the appropriate use of state law to con-
strue a federal grant of land bordering on a non-navigable body of
water, the Supreme Court provided the following guidance in
Oklahoma v. Texas:299
Where the United States owns the bed of a non-navigable stream
and the upland on one or both sides, it, of course, is free when dis-
posing of the upland to retain all or any part of the river bed; and
whether in any particular instance it has done so is essentially a
question of what it intended. If by a treaty or statute or the terms of
its patent it has shown that it intended to restrict the conveyance to
the upland or to that and a part only of the river bed, that intention
will be controlling; [citations] and, if its intention be not otherwise
shown, it will be taken to have assented that its conveyance should
be construed and given effect in this particular according to the law
of the State in which the land lies.3oo
297. 295 U.S. at 26-27 (citations omitted).
298. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
299. 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
300. Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added) (citing Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. at 384;
Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 413-14 (1891)).
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To apply this principle to the Alaska context, one would look first
to congressional expressions of federal interest in the submerged land
beneath Alaska's non-navigable water. By way of contrast, the histori-
cal policy of the federal government regarding public land in the lower
forty-eight was to dispose of federally-owned submerged lands as basi-
cally valueless and irrelevant to the purposes of the grants in issue.30'
The situation is markedly different regarding submerged lands in
Alaska, in which the Congress has shown a profound interest.302
Thus, under the rule of Oklahoma v. Texas, courts should resort to
state riparian law to settle questions of ownership only in the absence
of expressions of congressional interest in maintaining ownership of
Alaska's submerged lands.
IX. A PROPOSED PERSPECTIVE: THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN
ALASKA'S SUBMERGED LANDS
Throughout the cases involving title to beds of non-navigable
bodies of water adjacent to land transferred by federal grant, the
courts seem to apply a general rule regarding choice of law. That rule
is to look to the relative interests of the federal government and the
state. If the federal interest is significant, federal law is applied; if no
significant federal interest can be found, then state riparian law is
applied.
In Hughes v. Washington, 303 the Supreme Court explicitly recog-
nized this "federalness" rule. To resolve a question of riparian rights
to accretion deposited on the shoreland owned by a federal grantee,
the Court chose to apply federal, not state, law. The Court reasoned
that the question was one which involved important federal interests
and should, accordingly, be decided by a federal rule:
[The question] deals with waters that lap both the lands of the State
and the boundaries of the international sea. This relationship, at
this particular point of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital inter-
ests of the Nation in its own boundaries to allow it to be governed by
any law but the "supreme Law of the Land. ' '3 °4
301. See generally P. GATES, supra note 12; see also Indiana v. Milk, 11 F. 389, 393
(C.C.D. Ind. 1882) ("No right was reserved by the act of 1796 to the beds of non-
navigable streams, because the public had no interest in such streams, and it was not
the policy of the government to be a land-owner in the states.").
302. See infra text accompanying notes 307-22 (discussing three areas of federal
interest in Alaska lands).
303. 389 U.S. 290 (1967). Although Hughes addressed a question of riparian rights
to accretion incident to lands granted prior to statehood, the principle appears none-
theless applicable as a general rule.
304. Id. at 293 (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart
thought the issue should be resolved according to state law. Finding the state law,
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Assuming, arguendo, that it is appropriate to apply federal law in
the Alaska context, there still remains the issue of whether the courts
should borrow Alaska's rule regarding riparian rights or apply a sepa-
rate federal rule. The Supreme Court faced this issue in a similar situ-
ation involving riparian rights to accreted lands in Wilson v. Omaha
Indian Tribe.30 5 In that case the Court set forth a balancing test to
determine the relative interests of the state and the federal government
as a means of choosing the applicable law.30 6
In Alaska there are at least three separate areas of federal interest
that one could argue ought to be recognized under federal law: the
federal preservation interest, the federal contract interest, and the fed-
eral interest as expressed by congressional intent. Given these inter-
ests, the application of state law under the supposed "Hardin rule"
may well be questioned.
A. The Federal Preservation Interest
As indicated in Indiana v. Milk, 307 historically the federal govern-
ment has expressed little interest in the submerged lands beneath non-
navigable waters because such lands were seen as valueless; unfit for
either transportation or cultivation. Since the policy of the federal
government was to encourage settlement of the territory of the new
states, and not to preserve federal ownership,30 8 the application of
state riparian rights to federal grantees was not inappropriate. By con-
trast, the federal government has an incontrovertible interest in the
preservation of public lands in Alaska. This interest is evidenced by
the extensive congressional debates over how best to preserve "na-
tional interest lands" under ANILCA.30 9
declaring title to the beds of all navigable water bodies to be in the state, an unconsti-
tutional taking, he came to the same conclusion as the majority, although by a differ-
ent route. Id. at 295.
305. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
306. Id. at 671-72 ("Controversies... governed by federal law, do not inevitably
require resort to uniform federal rules .... Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a
nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial policy 'dependent upon a variety of
considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and
to the effects upon them of applying state law.'" (citations omitted)).
307. 11 F. 389 (C.C.D. Ind. 1882).
308. See generally P. GATES, supra note 12.
309. For example, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held
46 mark-up sessions during the 95th Congress and 12 in the 96th Congress before
agreeing upon the language to be used in the report to the full Senate. S. REP. No.




B. The Federal Contract Interest
One may view both the Alaska Statehood Act and ANCSA as
contracts to which the United States is a party.310 By these statutes,
the United States agreed to transfer certain lands to the state and to
the Natives. 311 Those agreements specify the quantity of land to
which the recipients are entitled. The new policy of the Department
of Interior is seen by some as giving the selector additional entitle-
ments - to the derogation of the original legislative contracts between
the United States and the State of Alaska, and the United States and
the Natives.
C. The Federal Interest as Expressed by Congressional Intent
In addition to the preservation and contract interests, Congress
has expressed its intentions regarding the disposition of Alaska's sub-
merged lands in several other instances. Section 6(g) of the Alaska
Statehood Act indicates that only exterior boundaries of the area to be
conveyed to the state should be drawn:
Where any lands desired by the State are unsurveyed at the time of
their selection, the Secretary of the Interior shall survey the exterior
boundaries of the area requested without any interior subdivision
thereof; and shall issue a patent for such selected area in terms of the
exterior boundary survey .... 312
Considered in context of congressional awareness of the extraordinary
size of the state grant,313 this provision could well be seen to evince the
expectation by Congress that meandering all water bodies would not
be a part of the selection and conveyance process of lands to the state.
Rather, it could be argued that all lands, both dry and submerged -
except those beneath navigable waters that are subject to the Equal
Footing Doctrine - should be included in the area conveyed and
charged against the state's total selectable acreage.
310. The Alaska Statehood Act states that "[a]s a compact with the United States
said State and its people do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and
title to any lands or other property not granted or confirmed to the State .... Pub. L.
No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. note preceding § 21
(1982)). Likewise, ANCSA is also a contract between the federal government and
Alaska Natives. The Natives agreed to relinquish their claims to aboriginal lands in
exchange for a sum of money and the right to select a certain amount of federal land.
The amounts of money and land agreed upon presumably reflect the relative value
Congress placed on the land. See generally ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
311. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
312. Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(g), 72 Stat. 339, 342
(codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. note preceding § 21 (1982)) (emphasis added).
313. See H.R. REP. No. 624, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2933, 2939.
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With regard to land grants to the Native corporations, ANCSA,
like the Statehood Act, provides that "[n]o ground survey or monu-
mentation will be required along meanderable water boundaries. 314
This provision indicates that the selection and conveyance process
could proceed without the traditional meandering specified in the
Manual of Survey Instructions. According to ANCSA, "only exterior
boundaries of the selected or designated areas at angle points" need be
surveyed, irrespective of any water bodies that lie within the sec-
tion.315 This provision seems to imply that Congress did not intend
that submerged lands beneath non-navigable waters would be segre-
gated out of the area surveyed for purposes of computing
chargeability. Taken together, these two statutory provisions seem to
indicate that; with regard to grants both to the state and the Natives,
Congress intended that the exterior boundaries would comprise the
ultimate boundaries of the selected tract, modified later, not by mean-
dering per se, but rather, by the final on-the-ground survey required
for the issuance of a patent. Furthermore, these provisions might well
be interpreted as implying that all the acreage included within these
exterior boundaries would be charged against the selector's
entitlement.
ANILCA also provides several indicia of congressional intent re-
garding the chargeability of submerged lands beneath non-navigable
waters. In section 901, Congress imposed a statute of limitations for
suits by the state challenging BLM determinations of non-navigabil-
ity.3 16 Were it intended by Congress that submerged lands beneath
navigable and non-navigable waters should be treated the same by the
Department (that is, meandered and segregated out of the survey)
there would have been no need for such a provision. In addition, the
Senate Report accompanying ANILCA 317 contains the following lan-
guage explaining section 909, which allowed the use of protraction di-
agrams in lieu of field surveys in patents issued under ANCSA:
There is some possibility of error in the acreage within a tract
shown by a diagram and what would be actually surveyed....
[G]enerally this is caused by water areas - streams, lakes, and
coastal shore lines.
Since there is this possibility of error in the acreage of an area,
any such loss or gain is born by the patentee.318
314. 43 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (1982).
315. Id.
316. ANILCA, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 901, 94 Stat. 2371, 2430 (1980) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982)).
317. S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 291, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5070, 5235.
318. Id. (emphasis added).
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Once again, this expression of Congress supports the view that it con-
sidered the tracts selected to be bounded by external, rectangular
boundaries, not by the meander lines of any water bodies within those
boundaries.
The version of ANILCA passed by the House in 1979 contained a
provision sponsored by Representatives Udall and Anderson under
which submerged lands beneath meanderable, non-navigable water
bodies would not be charged against the selector's entitlement. 319 A
year later, the Senate expressly rejected the House provision.3 20 In its
stead, the Senate adopted a statute of limitations for any state chal-
lenge to a BLM determination of non-navigability. 321 The House con-
ferees eventually agreed to the Senate provision and it was included in
the final bill.322 This outcome further supports the view that, to the
extent Congress considered the issue, it assumed that the total acreage
of land within the external boundaries of the tract, including sub-
merged land, was to be subtracted from the selector's entitlement, not
just the fastlands.
D. Submerged Lands Beneath Non-Navigable Waters in Alaska:
Questionable Application of State Riparian Law
Even if the applicable judicial precedents were clear, the analysis
of the question of the disposition of submerged lands beneath non-
navigable water bodies in Alaska would remain complicated. Princi-
ples of federalism, shared powers, constitutional law, and federal pol-
icy are all involved in the analysis. The lack of clear direction from
the courts only exacerbates the problem. Nevertheless, the following
propositions regarding the application of some traditional legal theo-
ries to the troublesome Alaska context may aid in the analysis:
1. The principle, adopted in Hardin v. Jordan, 323 that state law
should apply to settle questions of riparian rights associated with
lands adjacent to non-navigable waters transferred by federal grant,
is not necessarily appropriate to the Alaska context.
2. The federal statute of 1796 statement that "where the opposite
banks of any stream not navigable shall belong to different persons,
319. H.R. 39 § 918, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 11,459 (1979). The
Udall-Anderson Amendment was, in part, an effort to avoid legal battles over title.
320. See 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 23,376-23,378 (1980) (remarks by
Senator Tsongas on the legislative history of the submerged lands provisions of
ANILCA).
321. 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 21,596, 21,597, 21,614 (1980). The
statute of limitations was deemed necessary in order to solve the problem of any un-
certainty to the title of submerged lands created by any possible state attempts to
divest federal grantees by contesting a determination of non-navigability.
322. 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 21,891 (1980).
323. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
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the stream and the bed thereof shall become common to both" 324 is
based upon an obsolete policy favoring the disposal of federal lands
judged to be "valueless", and is not appropriate in the Alaska
context.
3. The Alaska situation is distinguishable from other historic in-
stances in the lower forty-eight states in that significant federal in-
terests are at stake. This situation demands application of federal
law to protect those interests.
4. Numerous indications of congressional intent support the posi-
tion that federal lands in Alaska should be surveyed to determine
only exterior rectangular boundaries, that the submerged lands be-
neath non-navigable waters should be included in the grant, and
that the acreage should be subtracted from the grantee's
entitlement. 325
If these four propositions are accepted, one might well question
the applicability of Alaska's state riparian law to federal grantees
under the Alaska Statehood Act and the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act. It certainly is not clear that the United States is required,
given judicial precedent or statutory law, to apply the no-charge rule
regarding submerged lands beneath non-navigable water bodies ad-
joining property transferred by federal grant in the Alaska context.
X. CONCLUSION
Despite their somewhat arcane and inaccessible nature, the twin
issues of navigability and chargeability have been the source of heated
battles among the various interest groups vying for control of the sub-
merged lands in Alaska. Unfortunately, the principles at issue have
not always been as clearly understood as they have been hotly con-
tested. Regrettably, throughout the debate there has been an unfortu-
nate emphasis on acquisition of property interests in a kind of zero-
sum game, with the natural resources of the lands beneath Alaska's
waters as booty.
The interests of the United States in these submerged areas and
the resources beneath them have not always been zealously champi-
oned by those responsible for them. Specifically, this article has fo-
cused on two areas in which a clearer understanding of the law would
provide greater protection for the public interest in Alaska's sub-
merged lands. First, the state's regulatory authority over, and the
public's usufructuary rights in, lands beneath those waters defined by
the state as navigable renders inappropriate the current emphasis on
contests over title as a means of regulatory control. Second, the recent
change in policy regarding the non-chargeability of lands beneath
324. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 55, 1 Stat. § 464 (1800) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 981 (1982)).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 212-322.
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meanderable, non-navigable water bodies in Alaska may derogate sig-
nificant interests of the United States in these lands. There are cer-
tainly ample opportunities for natural resource development, as well
as preservation, in Alaska. Both are necessary as we move into the
twenty-first century. The struggle over submerged lands in Alaska re-
quires a flexible approach in which the myriad facets of natural re-
source law, including title, regulatory control, public usufructuary
rights, and trust duty, are addressed separately and carefully, and not
atavistically linked to outmoded quests for ownership. Legal theories
that evolved during an earlier period in the development of public land
law, particularly those that did not recognize the value of submerged
lands, should not be applied unquestioningly to the unique Alaska
context.
